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Abstract 
This paper shows how agents’ choice in communicative action can be designed to mitigate the 
effect of their resource limits in the context of particular features of a collaborative planning task. 
I first motivate a number of hypotheses about effective language behavior based on a statistical 
analysis of a corpus of natural collaborative planning dialogues. These hypotheses are then tested 
in a dialogue testbed whose design is motivated by the corpus analysis. Experiments in the testbed 
examine the interaction between ( 1) agents’ resource limits in attentional capacity and inferential 
capacity; (2) agents’ choice in communication; and (3) features of communicative tasks that 
affect task difficulty such as inferential complexity, degree of belief coordination required, and 
tolerance for errors. The results show that good algorithms for communication must be defined 
relative to the agents’ resource limits and the features of the task. Algorithms that are inefficient 
for inferentially simple, low coordination or fault tolerant asks are effective when tasks require 
coordination or complex inferences, or are fault intolerant. The results provide an explanation for 
the occurrence of utterances in human dialogues that, prima facie, appear inefficient, and provide 
the basis for the design of effective algorithms for communicative choice for resource limited 
agents. 
1. Introduction 
Agents may engage in conversation for a range of reasons, e.g. to acquire information, 
to establish a contract, to make a plan, or to be social. At each point in a dialogue, 
agents must make communicative choices about what to say and how and when to 
say it. This paper focuses on agents’ communicative choice in collaborative planning 
dialogues, dialogues whose purpose is to discuss and agree on a plan for future action, 
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and potentially execute that plan. 1 will argue that agents’ choices in communicative 
action, their algorithms for language behavior. must be determined with respect to two 
relatively unexplored factors in models of collaborative planning dialogues: ( I ) agents’ 
resource limits. such as limits in attentional and inferential capacity; and (2) features 
of collaborative planning tasks that affect task difficulty, such as inferential complexity, 
the degree of belief coordination required, and tolerance for errors. 
A primary dimension of communicative choice is the degree of explicitness. For 
example. consider a simple task of agent A and agent B trying to agree on a plan for 
furnishing a two-room house. Imagine that A wants B to believe the proposition realized 
by ( I ) and believes that B can infer this from the propositions realized in (2): ’ 
( I I II‘ we agree to put the green couch in the study, we will have a matched pair of 
furniture in the study. 
t 2 ) c a) I propose that we put the green couch in the study. 
C t-11 We intend to put the green chair in the study. 
( c) Two furniture items of the same color in the same room achieve a matched 
pair. 
In naturally occurring dialogues, A may product utterances realizing the propositions in 
( 3 )-( 6 ). or other variations [ 30, 109. 13.3, I3 I 1. 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
A: I propose that we put the green couch in the study. 
A: We intend to put the green chair in the study. I propose that we put the green 
couch in the study. 
A: Two furniture items of the same color in the same room achieve a matched 
pair. We intend to put the green chair in the study. I propose that we put the 
green couch in the study. 
A: I propose that we put the green couch in the study. That will get us a matched 
pair. 
The communicative choices in (3 )-( 6) illustrate a general fact: for any communicative 
act. the same effect can be achieved with a range of acts at various levels of explicitness. 
This raises a key issue: On what basis does A choose among the more or less explicit 
versions of the proposal in C 3 )-C 6) ? 
The single constraint that has been suggested elsewhere in the literature is the FE- 
DUNDANCY CONSTRAINT: A should not say information that B already knows, or 
that B could infer. The IUXNINDANC~ CONSTRAINT appears in the form of sim- 
ple dictums such as “don’t tell people what they already know”. as Grice’s Quantity 
Maxim “do not make your contribution more informative than is required” [47] and as 
constraints on planning operators for the generation and recognition of communicative 
plans [2. 13.27.86.92 J So. if we assume that B knows (2b) and (2~). then the only 
possibility for what A can say is (3). 
’ These ewmples arc I‘rom the domain of Design-World to be discussed in Section 4 and are abstractions 
from naturally occurring examples in which the propositions realized here are realized in a number of different 
ways. Here the focus i< on the logical relationships between the content of each proposition: (?a) and (2b) 
arc minor premises and (2~) is the major premise for the inference under discussion. 
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The REDUNDANCY CONSTRAINT is based on the assumption that agent A should 
leave implicit any information she believes that B already knows or she believes that 
B could infer, in other words, that agent B can always “fill in what is missing” by 
a combination of retrieving facts from memory and making inferences. In Section 2, 
I will show that agents in natural dialogues consistently violate the REDUNDANCY 
CONSTRAINT. I will argue that this should not be particularly surprising since the 
REDUNDANCY CONSTRAINT is based on several simplifying assumptions: 
(i) UNLIMITED WORKING MEMORY ASSUMPTION: everything an agent knows is 
always available for reasoning; 
(ii) LOGICAL OMNISCIENCE ASSUMPTION: agents are logically omniscient; 
(iii) FEWEST UTTERANCES ASSUMPTION: utterance production is the only process 
that should be minimized; 
(iv) No AUTONOMY ASSUMPTION: assertions and proposals by agent A are ac- 
cepted by default by agent B. 
When agents are autonomous and resource limited, these assumptions do not always 
hold, and the problem of communicative choice remains. 
The plan for the paper is as follows: Section 2 motivates a number of hypotheses 
about the relationship of communicative choice, resource limits and task features using 
evidence from natural collaborative planning dialogues. These hypotheses are the basis 
of a model of collaborative planning presented in Section 3. Then Section 4 describes 
how the model is implemented in a testbed for collaborative planning dialogues called 
Design-World, which supports experiments on the interaction of agents’ communicative 
choice, resource limits, and features of the task. At this point, in Section 4.1, I review 
the steps of the method applied so far, and motivate the use of simulation as a method 
for testing the hypotheses. Section 5 presents the experimental results and discusses 
the extent to which the hypotheses were confirmed, and then Section 6 discusses the 
theoretical implications of these results and the extent to which they can be generalized 
to other tasks, agent properties, and communication strategies. 
2. Communicative choice in dialogue 
Naturally occurring collaborative planning dialogues are design, problem solving, 
diagnostic or advice giving dialogues [ 14,21,30,37,49,97,104,128,141,143]. In order 
to generate hypotheses about the relation of communicative choice to agent properties 
and task features, this section examines communicative choice in naturally occurring 
collaborative planning dialogues. Most of the examples discussed below are excerpts 
from a corpus of dialogues from a radio talk show for financial planning advice [98] ,2 
but I will also draw on data from collaborative design, collaborative construction, and 
computer support dialogues [ 28,139,142,143]. 
Dialogue, in general, is modeled as a process by which conversants add to what is 
assumed to be already mutually believed or intended. This set of assumed mutual beliefs 
* The corpus consists of 55 dialogues from 5 hours of live radio broadcast, where each dialogue ranged in 
length from 23 to 100 turns. 
and intentions is called the DISCOURSE MODEL, or the COMMON GROUND [ II9,140]. 
In collaborative planning dialogues, the conversants are attempting to add mutual beliefs 
about the current state of the world and mutual beliefs and intentions about a plan for 
future action to the discourse model. It is obvious that the efficacy of the final plan 
and the efficiency of the planning process must be affected by agents’ algorithms for 
communicative choice. 
However previous work has not systematically varied factors that affect communicative 
choice, such as resource limits and task complexity. Furthermore, most previous work 
has been based on the REDUNDANCY CONSTRAINT, and apparently, its concomitant 
simplifying assumptions (but see [78, 147. 14X] ). 
To explore the relation of communicative choice to effective collaborative planning, 
the analysis of naturally occurring collaborative planning dialogues in this paper focuses 
on communicative acts that violate the REDUNDANCY CONSTRAINT. These acts are 
INFORMATIONALLY REDUNDANI‘ IJTIERANCES, IRUs. defined as:3 
Definition of informational redundancy. An utterance u, is INFORMATIONALLY RE- 
DUNDANT in a discourse situation S 
(i) if II, expresses a proposition pL, and another utterance nj that entails p; has 
already been said in S; 
(ii) if II, expresses a proposition pi. and another utterance n, that presupposes or 
implicates p, has already been said in S. 
A statistical analysis of‘ the tinancial advice corpus showed that about 12% of the 
utterances are IRUs. As mentioned in Section 1. this should not be particularly surprising 
since the definition of IRUs reflects several simplifying assumptions. For example. the 
definition reflects the LOGICAL OMNISCIENCE ASSUMPTION because it assumes that 
all the entailments of propositions uttered in a discourse and certain default inferences 
from propositions uttered in a discourse become part of the discourse model. 4 The 
definition reflects the NO AUTONOMY ASSUMPTION because it assumes that merely 
saying an utterance II, that expresses a proposition p, is sufficient for adding p, to the 
discourse model. The fact that IRUs occur shows that the simplifying assumptions are 
no1 valid. 
The distributional analysis suggests that there are at least three functional categories 
of IRUs: 
Communicative functions of IRUs. 
l Attitude: to provide evidence supporting beliefs about mutual understanding and 
acceptance. 
’ The first part of the definition is a variation on Hirschberg‘s detinition of redundant [ S9) which is used in 
her theory of scalar implicature. This view of information is also the basis of information theoretic work such 
ab 16 1 
4 Presuppositions and implicatures are tuo type5 of default inferences ( 44.46.69.82. I24 I. The corpus 
analysis tagged defaults separately from entailments hut found no evidence for a functional difference (see 
II?31 I 
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Attention: to manipulate the locus of attention of the discourse participants by 
making a proposition salient. 
Consequence: to augment the evidence supporting beliefs that certain inferences 
are licensed. 
IRUs have ANTECEDENTS in the dialogue which are the utterances that originally 
realized the content of the IRU either through direct assertion or by an inferential chain; 
in the definition above u,j is an antecedent for ui. The three communicative functions 
of IRUs were identified by correlations with distributional features based in part on 
relations between the IRU and its antecedent, such as textual distance, discourse struc- 
ture relations, and logical relations. The distributional analysis also analyzed utterance 
features such as the intonational realization of the IRU, the form of the IRU, and the 
relation of the IRU to adjacent utterances. 
Below, I will briefly give examples of each type of IRU.’ For each type I will 
explain how the four simplifying assumptions of previous dialogue models predict that 
the utterance is informationally redundant. Then we will consider hypothetical agent and 
task properties under which IRUs function as hypothesized above. 
2.1. Attitude IRUs 
Attitude IRUs provide evidence supporting beliefs about mutual understanding and 
acceptance by demonstrating the speaker’s attitude to an assertion or proposal made 
by another agent in dialogue. An Attitude IRU, said with a falling intonation typical 
of a declarative utterance, is given in (7.27)) where M repeats what H has asserted. 
in (7.26). M and H have been discussing how M and her husband can handle funds 
invested in IRAs (individual retirement accounts). In (7), and in the other naturally 
occurring examples below, the ANTECEDENTS of the IRUs are italicized and the IRUs 
are in CAPS. 
(7) (24) H: That is correct. It could be moved around so that each of you have two 
thousand. 
(25) M: I see. 
(26) H: Without penalty. 
(27) M: WITHOUT PENALTY. 
(28) H: Right. 
(29) M: And the fact that I have a, an account of my own from a couple of 
years ago, when I was working, doesn’t affect this at all. 
s Each communicative function given above includes a number of subtypes that will not be represented 
by these examples. In addition, the hypothesis that IRUs are a rehearsal mechanism, i.e. agents repeat 
propositions as an aid to memory, is tested in every experiment by the model of attention/working memory. 
The hypothesis that agents say IRUs because they cannot think of anything else to say (the DEAD AIR 
hypothesis) was considered in [ 1311, but I as yet have found no evidence to support it. For example, other 
indications of hesitation or planning what to say, such as disfluencies and long pauses, are not associated with 
IRUs. 
Header: INPORMC speaker, hearer, proposition ) . 
prccondition: KNOWI spcakcr, proposition), 
want-precondi Lion: speaker want INFORMS speaker, hearer. proposition 
cffcct: KNOWI hearer. proposition). 
-__ . .._.____-.~ _ 
Fig. i t_)rtlnlllon 01 the INFORM pian operalor in 1 ? I. 
The IRU in ( 27 ) provides direct evidence that M heard exactly what H said [ 8.2 I 1. 
According to arguments elaborated below and elsewhere 1 13 I, 1331, M’s response 
indirectly provides evidence that she accepts and therefore believes what H has as- 
serted. 
The classilication of ( 7.27 1 as 311 IRU li)llows horn the NO-AUTONOMY ASSUMP- 
‘I‘lON. The NO-AUTONOMY ASSUMPTION is usually characterized as an agent being 
“cooperative” or “helpful”. For example, the motivation for the plan effect of the IN- 
FORM planning operator from 12) in Fig. I is that the hearer is cooperative. In other 
words. a cooperative hearer always accepts and therefore believes (or knows) what 
the speaker has previously asscrtcd. But if the effect of the INFORM act always goes 
through. then there is no reason for M to choose to produce an Attitude IRU in (7.27). 
in response to H’s inform in f 7.26). 
In recent work. the plan clf‘ect shown in Fig. I is treated as a default [ 5 I, 67.96, 105 J
Pcrrault’a bclicl‘ transfer rule handles inferring the default acceptance of assertions (in- 
form acts). while Grosz and Sidncr’s conversational default rule CDR2 handles inferring 
the default acceptance of proposals [ 51.961. In both cases, the default inference of ac- 
ceptancc of an assertion of P or a proposal to achieve P depends on the cooperativity of 
the hearer and on whether or not the hearer previously believed or intended to achieve 
-P. However. Attitude IRUs arc produced in many situations. where there is no reason 
for the default not to go through. In advice givin g dialogues, the hearer is cooperative 
and the hearer does not previously believe or intend to achieve -P, yet Attitude IRUs 
are common when the caller asks the talk show host a question and then repeats or 
paraphrases his response to the question with an Attitude IRU. 
Clark and Schaefer proposed that Attitude IRUs provide positive evidence of under- 
standing [ 9.20.2 1 ]. They allow for undcrstandin g to be implicitly conveyed, but say 
that the amount of explicit positive evidence should bc “sufficient for current purposes”. 
However. Clark and Schaefer do not address the question of belief transfer since they 
do not distinguish between indicating understanding and indicating acceptance. Further- 
more. they make no predictions about what features of current purposes require more 
or Icss positive evidence. and thus lead an agent to produce an Attitude IRU. 
Thus, neither the addition of defaults nor the positive evidence model makes any 
predictions about when an agent should produce an Attitude IRU, since the inference of 
acceptance goes through by default without the Attitude IRU. 
In order to explain the function of Attitude IRUs, the NO-AUTONOMY ASSUMPTION 
must be replaced with the assumption that hearers always either explicitly or implicitly 
accept or rcject each utterance act that is intended to change their beliefs or intentions. 
In Section 3. these observations are incorporated into a model of collaborative planning 
dialogue. Results from testing hypotheses related to the choice to produce Attitude 
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IRUs are presented elsewhere [ 131, 133,135], and will not be discussed further in this 
paper. 
2.2. Consequence IRUs 
Consequence IRUs make inferences explicit. For example, consider (8.17): 
(8) ( 15) H: Oh no. IRAs were available as long as you are not a participant in an 
existing pension. 
(16) J. Oh I see. Well I did work, I do work for a company that has a pension. 
( 17) H: Ahh. THEN YOU’RE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR EIGHTY ONE. 
In (8), (8.15) realizes a biconditional inference rule, (8.16) instantiates one of the 
premises of this rule, and (8.17) realizes an inference that follows from (8.15) and 
(8.16), for the particular tax year of 1981, by the inference rule of modus tollens. 
The definition of (8.17) as an IRU follows from the LOGICAL OMNISCIENCE AS- 
SUMPTION. If all entailments of utterances are automatically added to the discourse 
model then (8.17) should not occur. However it is well known that neither human 
nor artificial agents are logically omniscient [45,55,63,73,95]. Agents might not have 
enough time to make all the relevant inferences even when they know all the relevant 
inference rules [ 721, especially since producing and interpreting speech in real time has 
heavy planning and processing requirements. Thus plausible hypotheses are that: 
l HYPOTH-Cl: Agents choose to produce Consequence IRUs to demonstrate that 
they made the inference that is made explicit. 
l HYPOTH-C2: Agents choose to produce Consequence IRUs to ensure that the other 
agent has access to inferrable information. 
These hypotheses are motivated by the fact that agents are not logically omniscient. 
In addition, in the case of hypothesis C2, agents may choose to produce Consequence 
IRUs to ensure that the other agents have access to inferrable information in a timely 
manner, even when, in principle, they believe the other agent is capable of making the 
inference. 
However, much of communicative efficiency relies on the fact that agents do make 
some inferences from what has been said. Thus plausible refinements of hypotheses Cl 
and C2 are that: 
l HYPOTH-C3: The choice to produce a Consequence IRU is directly related to a 
measure of “how hard” the inference is. 
l HYPGTH-C4: The choice to produce a Consequence IRU is directly related to a 
measure of “how important” the inference is. 
l HYPOTH-C5: The choice to produce a Consequence IRU is directly related to the 
degree to which the task requires agents to be coordinated on the inferences that 
they have made. 
Confirmation of these hypotheses entails that the FEWEST UTTERANCES ASSUMPTION 
does not hold whenever processing effort is relevant to achieving the conversational 
goals. 
2.3. Attentiorl IRUs 
Attention IRUs manipulate the locus of attention of the discourse participants by 
making a proposition salient. Attention IRUs often realize facts that are inferentially 
related to the assertion or proposal that the speaker is making. For example, consider 
f 9) said by agent A to agent B while walking to work: 
(9) (a) Let’s walk along Walnut St. 
( b) IT’S SHORTER. 
Agent B already knew that the Walnut Street route was shorter. so, by the REDUNDANCY 
CONSTRAINT, A should have simply said (9a ). 
The classification of (9b) as an IRU reflects the UNLIMITED WORKING MEMORY 
assumption. If everything an agent knows is always available for reasoning, then agents 
should never make communicative choices to include utterances such as (9b). However, 
it is well known that human agents have limited attention/working memory [5,91,95]. 
and resource-bounded artificial agents with limited time to access memory also have 
limited attentional capacity. 
If we define SALIENT propositions as those that are accessible to a resource limited 
agent at a particular point in time 1 102, 1031, then a possible hypothesis is that A said 
(9b’) to provide B with a salient reason to accept A’s proposal to walk along Walnut St. 
Similar observations apply to ( IO): 
( 10) (a) Clinton has to take a stand on abortion rights for poor women. 
( b) HE’S THE PRESIDENT. 
Here i lob) is already known to the discourse participants, but saying it makes it 
salient. In order to account for ( lob) we must modify the specific hypothesis above 
to reflect the difference in utterance type hetween (9a) and ( lOa). Utterance (9a) is 
a PROPOSAL whereas ( 10a) is an INFORM. In ( IO). A said ( lob) to provide B with 
a salient reason to accept A’s assertion about Clinton’s obligations. Utterance (9b) is a 
WARRANT for adopting A’s proposal in (9a). and f lob) is SUPPORT for belief in A’s 
assertion. 6 
l HYPtYI%AI : Agents produce Attention IRUs to support the processes of deliber- 
ating beliefs and intentions. 
Hypothesis Al means that the production 01‘ Attention IRUs is a surface manifestation 
of the fact that agents’ limited working memory limits the accessibility of beliefs used 
as the basis of deliberation. The hypothesis that the function of Attention IRUs is to 
make information salient to support interpretation and reasoning is formulated in the 
DISCOURSE INFERENCE CONSTRAINT: 
l HYPOTH-A2: There is a DISCOURSE INFERENCE CONSTRAINT whose effect is 
that inferences in dialogue are derived from propositions that are currently discourse 
salient ( in working memory). 
’ The relationship between these utterances ha been characterized as the inference of a discourse relation 
189 1. or the inference of the speaker’s intention 192 1. Moser and Moore and Hobbs have argued that these 
two views are functionally equivalent 16 I, 93 I. 
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The DISCOURSE INFERENCE CONSTRAINT is quite general since the inferences that 
A intends B to make may be any inferences related to the dialogue such as logical 
deductions, commonsense defaults, inferring part of A’s plan, or inferring relations such 
as WARRANT or SUPPORT [92,134,141]. 
A more complex example illustrating the relationship of limited working memory, 
inferential processing, and agents’ communicative choice is dialogue ( 11). The caller E 
has been telling H, the talk show host, how all her money is invested and then poses a 
question in (11.3): 
(11) (3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
E: . . .and I was wondering-should I continue on with the certificates or, 
H: Well it’s difficult to tell because we’re so far away from any of them. 
But I would suggest this-if all of these are 6 month certificates and I 
presume they are, 
E: yes, 
H: then I would like to see you start spreading some of that money 
around, 
E: uh huh, 
H: Now in addition, how old are you? 
(discussion about retirement investments consisting of 14 utterances) 
E: uh huh and 
(a) H: But as far as the certificates are concerned, 
(b) I’D LIKE THEM SPREAD OUT A LITTLE BIT. 
(c) THEY’RE ALL 6 MONTH CERTIFICATES. 
E: yes, 
H: and I don’t like putting all my eggs in one basket. . . . 
The utterances in (22b) and (22~) realize two propositions established as mutually be- 
lieved in utterances (4)-(7)) thus they are IRUs. Utterance (8) initiates a subdialogue 
digression about retirement investments. Since the discussion about retirement invest- 
ments consists of 14 utterances in which the information in (4)-(7) is not discussed. 
a plausible hypothesis is that, at (22a), H believes that the information expressed in 
(4)-( 7) is no longer salient [ 1361. However, H expects E to use this information to 
make two inferences: (1) that having all your investments in 6 month certificates is an 
INSTANCE OF the negatively evaluated condition of having all your eggs in one basket; 
and (2) that this is a WARRANT for E to adopt the intention to spread the certificates 
out a little bit. Here, therefore, we see two types of inferences: a content-based infer- 
ence, INSTANCE OF, in the first case and a deliberation-based inference, WARRANT, 
in the second. It appears that H produces IRUs to ensure that these inferences get 
made and that H is basing his communicative choice on the DISCOURSE INFERENCE 
CONSTRAINT. 
In addition to the naturally occurring examples of Attention IRUs, another source 
of evidence for the DISCOURSE INFERENCE CONSTRAINT is the distribution of IRUs 
that make inferences explicit such as the Consequence IRU in dialogue (B), Section 
2.2. Fig. 2 contrasts the distribution of Consequence IRUs and paraphrases, which 
Consequence IRUs Paraphrase IRUs 
Antecedents salient 24 43 
Antecedents not salient x 39 
Fig 2. Distribution of Consequence IKUs that make inferences explicit, as compared with paraphrases, 
according to whether their antecedents are currently salient. 
arc IWO different ways in which an IRU can relate logically to the prior discourse.7 
Paraphrases are syntactic or semantic transformations of a single antecedent utterance 
[ 65,901. Inferences are distinguished from paraphrases by requiring the application of 
a logical inference rule such as modus ponens. A key difference is that inferences have 
multiple antecedents while paraphrases do not. A priori we would not expect inferences 
and paraphrases. as two types of entailments, to distribute differently with respect to 
whether their antecedents are salient. s However Fig. 2 shows that INFERENCES are 
more likely lo have salient premises than PARAPHRASES (,y' = 4.835, p < 0.05. 
(If = I ). This distributional fact provides evidence for the DISCOURSE INFERENCE 
CONSTRAINT because whenever we have evidence that an inference has been made, the 
premises are likely to be salient. 
The data discussed above provide evidence for the DISCOURSE INFERENCE CON- 
STRAINT. however it is clear that the effect of the constraint is strongly determined 
by the limits on working memory. In particular, a corollary of the constraint is that 
inferential complexity can be directly related to the number of premises that must be si- 
multancously salient for the inference to be made. These hypotheses can be summarized 
as follows: 
l HYPOTH-A3: The choice to produce an Attention IRU is related to the degree of 
inferential complexity of a task as measured by the number of premises required 
to make task-related inferences. 
l HYPOTH-A4: The choice to produce an Attention IRU is related to the degree to 
which an agent is resource limited in attentional capacity. 
Finally. it is obvious that various tasks can be characterized in terms of the degree 
of inferential complexity, and that observations about belief coordination similar to 
those made about Consequence IRUs also apply to Attention IRUs. giving hypothe- 
sis AS. 
l HYPOTH-AS: The choice to produce an Attention IRU is related to the degree to 
which the task requires agents to be coordinated on the inferences that they have 
made. 
In the next sections we will see how WC can test these hypotheses 
’ The other categories are repetitions. making implicatures explicit and making presuppositions explicit. 
’ For the corpus analysis. salient utterances are those within the last two turns. This measure is not perfect 
but it is replicable. 
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3. Modeling resource limited collaborative planning dialogues 
The naturally occurring examples discussed in the previous section gave rise to a 
number of hypotheses as to the situations in which communicative choices to include 
IRUs could either improve the efficacy of a collaborative plan or the efficiency of the 
dialogue by which that plan was constructed. In this section, I will specify the details 
of a model of collaoorative planning that will be used as the basis of the dialogue 
simulation testbed in which the hypotheses can be tested. In thinking about models of 
collaborative planning, I have found it useful to consider models in terms of six features: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
agent architecture, 
role of resource limits: whether the agents constructing the collaborative plan 
have limited resources, and thus whether there is an attempt to either maximize 
or minimize any aspect of resource consumption, and if so which aspects, 
the mutual belief model: whether the function of the dialogue is to establish 
mutual beliefs, and whether the mutual belief model is binary or allows for 
defaults in mutual beliefs, 
utterance act types: types of acts available for agents to communicate with other 
agents and the effects of each act on the cognitive state of the agents and the 
collaborative planning process, 
mixed initiative: whether one agent is the initiator or both agents have equal 
initiative, 9 
plan evaluation: how the collaborative plan is evaluated and what factors deter- 
mine how good the collaborative plan is. 
Most accounts of collaborative planning dialogues are not specific about all of these 
features, although some accounts provide rich models of particular features. For example, 
Smith and Guinn provide a richer model of mixed initiative than that provided here 
[ 53,117], and there are precise models of how hearers infer the utterance act type or 
the intention underlying a particular communicative action [ 1,86,112, 1271. However, 
to my knowledge no previous work has included a specification of the agent architecture, 
the relationship of the architecture to language behavior, the role of resource limits, and 
the plan evaluation process. The remainder of this section provides a specification for 
each of these features. 
3. I. Agent architecture, mutual belief and resource limits 
Both the agent architecture and the role of resource limits are addressed by adopting an 
agent architecture based on the IRMA architecture for resource-bounded agents, shown 
in Fig. 3 [ 7,991. The IRMA architecture has not previously been used to model the 
behavior of agents in dialogue. The basic components of the modified IRMA architecture 
are: 
y This is also called “control” [ 116.1431. Walker and Whittaker and Guinn argued that the distribution of 
control in natural dialogue is primarily determined by whether information relevant to the task is distributed 
between the agents or primarily known by one agent [52,139]. 
I 
. . . . . . 
BELIEF DELIBERATION 
ATTENTIONMiORKlNG MEMORY (AWM) 
MEANS-END REASONER 
FILTERING MECHANISM 
I COMPATIBILITY FILTER 
MESSAGE PLANNING 
(mediated by dialogue strategies) 
/ I I 
V 
> INTENTION DELIBERATION COMMUNICATIVE ACTIONS 
Fig. 3. The IRMA agent architecture for resource-hounded agents with limited attention (AWM). 
Beliefs: a database of an agent’s beliefs. This includes beliefs that an agent believes 
to be mutual to some degree 
Belief deliberation: decides what an agent wants to believe when there is conflicting 
evidence. 
Intentions: a database of an agent’s intentions. This includes intentions that an agent 
believes to be mutual to some degree. 
Plan library: what an agent knows about plans as recipes to achieve goals. 
Means-end reasoner: reasons about how to fill in existing partial plans, proposing 
options that serve as subplans for the plans an agent has in mind. 
Filtering mechanism: checks options for compatibility with the agent’s existing 
plans. Options deemed compatible are passed along to the deliberation process. ” 
“’ The filtering mechanism presented in I 7 j and used in TileWorld is more complex than that presented here 
because that work explored the issue of when current intentions get over-ridden. 
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Desires: agents may have different types of desires but here I assume that their 
only desire is to maximize utility [ 341. 
Intention deliberation: decides which of a set of options to pursue (by an evaluation 
based on desires such as maximizing utility). 
Attention/ working memory ( AWM) : the limited attention module constrains work- 
ing memory and the retrieval of current beliefs and intentions that are used by the 
means-end reasoner. 
For the purpose of modeling dialogue, the architecture has been extended with a model 
of mutual belief that allows for different degrees of mutual belief. For the purpose of 
exploring the effects of resource bounds on attention, this architecture has been extended 
with a model of limited attention. All of the modules are standard except for the AWM 
module described in detail below, and the mutual belief module which will be briefly 
described. 
Attention/working memory model 
The model of limited AWM is a cognitively based model adapted from [ 761, which 
fits many empirical results on human memory and learning [4,31,.57,75,118,121,129]. 
The motivation for using a cognitively based model of AWM is to model the behavior 
of agents in naturally occurring dialogues and to test a theory of collaborative commu- 
nication with humans. ” 
The key properties of the model are that (1) limits on AWM are parameters of the 
model and can be varied to explore different limits [ 51; (2) items encountered more 
recently are more likely to be salient [ 761; (3) items encountered more frequently are 
more likely to be salient [ 581. 
These recency and frequency effects are a key aspect of the AWM model for testing 
the hypothesized functions of IRUs. Below I will discuss a particular implementation of 
this model and its role in testing the hypotheses. 
AWM is modeled as a three-dimensional space in which propositions acquired from 
perceiving the world are stored in chronological sequence according to the location of 
a moving memory pointer. The sequence of memory loci used for storage constitutes a 
random walk through memory with each loci a short distance from the previous one. If 
items are encountered multiple times, they are stored multiple times [ 581. The fact that 
the sequence of storage locations is random means that the recency and frequency effects 
are stochastically determined. This means that when this model is used in simulation, 
the simulation produces different results each time. 
When an agent retrieves items from memory, search starts from the current pointer 
location and spreads out in a spherical fashion. The resource limited aspect of AWM 
follows from the fact that search is restricted to a particular search radius defined in 
Hamming distance. For example, if the current memory pointer loci is (0 0 O), the loci 
distance 1 away would be (010) (O-IO) (001) (00-I) (-100) (100). The 
actual locations are calculated modulo the memory size. 
I’ Some of the features of the model hold for processors in general, such as the feature that items that have 
been discussed more recently are more likely to be accessible with little effort, and that incoming information 
can displace other information from working memory. 
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The limit on the search radius defines the subset of the belief and intentions database 
that is SALIENT. In addition, the fact that the pointer moves has the effect that the salient 
subset is always changing. Effectively, as new facts are added, others are displaced and 
become no longer salient, so that the SALIENT predicate is dynamic. 
The search radius limit defines the AWM parameter that will be varied in the ex- 
periments in Section 5 in order to test the effect of different resource limitations. 
Experiments that Landauer performed showed that, for a task requiring remembering 
whether a word belonged to a list of words. the model can be parameterized so that 
an AWM of 7 reproduces the human performance results in [ 571. Since no systematic 
tests have been performed for human performance on the collaborative planning tasks 
investigated below. the experiments are run at LOW, MID and HIGH AWM settings. 
Human performance is assumed to fall somewhere in the middle of these ranges. 
The model of’ attention/working memory ( AWM) provides a means of testing the 
hypothesized DISCOURSE INFERENCE CONSTRAINT introduced in Section 2.3. Re- 
member that the discourse inference constraint states that inferences in discourse are 
derived from propositions that are currently in working memory. The AWM model, as 
shown in Fig. 3, limits the beliefs accessible for means-end reasoning and deliberation 
to the subset of beliefs that are currently in AWM [55,66.68,95]. These beliefs are 
defined as being SALIENT. 
This model contrasts with the standard view of inference, where if an agent believes 
P and believes P - Q. then the agent believes Q. The discourse inference constraint 
provides a principled way of limiting inference in modeling humans by requiring the 
premises of P and P + Q to be salient. An axiomatization requires the predicate 
SALIENT and inference rules as follows for each inference rule schema [ 6 1, 1331: 
Irlfkrencr under the discoursr ir@rerlce cwstmirlt 
Say(A.B, PI -4 Salient(B. PI. 
Salient(B, P) .A BEL(B, P) A Salient(B. P - Q) A BEL( B. P --i Q) 
.- BEL(B,Q). 
The first inference rule states that whenever agent A says an utterance to B that realizes 
proposition P, that P becomes salient for B. The second rule states that whenever a 
proposition P and an inference rule, P --t Q. are both believed by B and salient for B. 
then B can use them to infer Q. The model of AWM must be consulted to determine 
when the SALIENT predicate holds. 
The model of mutual belief is based on Lewis’ shared environment model of mutual 
belief 16. 19,841, extended to support different degrees of mutual belief by tagging 
beliefs with qualitative endorsements at the time that they are formed and stored in the 
beliefs database [ 29, 401 421. Different degrees of mutual belief allow some actions to be 
left to inference and some inferences to be defaults. This makes it possible to distinguish 
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between the explicit acceptance of a proposal and the acceptance of a proposal inferred 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary. When agents are not logically omniscient, it 
is possible to distinguish between mutual beliefs about what has been mutually inferred 
and information that has been discussed in the dialogue. See [ 131,133] for more detail. 
3.2. Discourse acts, utterance acts, and mixed initiative 
The overall structure of the discourse in collaborative planning dialogues is primarily 
determined by the task structure [49,85,100,111]. Each subpart of the task consists of 
a dialogue segment in which agents negotiate what they should do for that part of the 
task. 
As discussed in Section 2.1, we wish to abandon the NO AUTONOMY ASSUMPTION. 
The model should allow either agent to initiate the dialogue or initiate a subdialogue 
about a new part of the task [ 32,139]. For each agent to be able to do this, knowledge 
about the task must be distributed between the participants so that each participant has 
a basis for means-end reasoning and deliberation. 
Furthermore, agents should be able to ACCEPT or REJECT one another’s proposals. 
Each plan step contributing to a higher level goal must remain open for negotiation 
even if both agents are committed to coming up with a collaborative plan for the higher 
level goal. This contrasts with models in which proposals for each plan substep that the 
initiator makes must be accepted by the non-initiator, once the non-initiator has agreed 
to work on a collaborative plan [26,51]. 
Discourse acts and mixed initiative 
To engage in collaborative planning, agents take turns sending messages, and each turn 
may consist of one or more DISCOURSE ACTS. Discourse acts are OPENING, CLOSING, 
PROPOSAL, ACCEPTANCE, REJECTION and CLAFURCATION. These are higher level 
acts that are composed of primitives called UTIERANCE ACTS, which will be described 
below. 
The schema of discourse actions shown in Fig. 4 controls the sequence of discourse 
acts and which discourse acts can be combined into a single turn. I2 The discourse act 
schema is the basis of an algorithm by which agents achieve a COLLABORATIVE PLAN. 
For each step in the domain plan: 
(i) individual agents perform means-end reasoning about options in the domain; 
(ii) individual agents deliberate about which options are preferable; 
(iii) then one agent initiates a subdialogue consisting minimally of a PROPOSAL 
to the other agent, based on the options identified in a reasoning cycle, about 
actions that contribute to the satisfaction of their goals; 
(iv) then the proposal may be subject to CLARIFICATION, after which it is either AC- 
CEPTED or REJECTED by the other agent, by calculating whether it maximizes 
utility. 
I2 This schema cannot describe all discourse action transitions in every type of dialogue [80.81,1 IO]. One 
required extension is to allow multiple proposals to be simultaneously open f 107.1131. 
--- .- 
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This algorithm ties the discourse act schema in Fig. 4 to the IRMA architecture. 
The requirement that agents must indicate whether they accept or reject each proposal 
follows from replacing the assumption of cooperativity in earlier work [2,511 with the 
COLLABORATIVE PRINCIPLE: 
l COLLABORATIVE PRINCIPLE: Conversants must provide evidence of a detected 
discrepancy in belief as soon as possible. 
The COLLABORATIVE PRINCIPLE W;LS proposed in [ 13 I 1, and is an abstraction of the 
COLLABORATIVE PLANNING PRINCIPLES of Whittakerand Stenton [ 1431 and Walker 
and Whittaker ( 1391. The COLLABORATIVE; PRINCIPLE means that speakers must 
monitor the next action by the hearer in order to detect the effects of their utterances. If 
the hearer continues the dialogue and provides no evidence of a belief discrepancy, the 
inference of acceptance is licensed as a default 139.1311. 
The fact that agents evaluate both assertions and proposals before deciding what to 
believe or intend follows from the IRMA agent architecture in Fig. 3. As the figure 
shows, incoming messages about intentions and beliefs are subject to intention or belief 
deliberation. This provides the basis for abandoning the No AUTONOMY ASSUMPTION 
while specifying rvhy an agent would accept or reject another agent’s proposal (see also 
[ 34,38.4 I ] ). Agents evaluate assertions and proposals from other agents by assessing 
the support for assertions and the warrants for proposals. Finally, as Fig. 3 shows, 
this evaluation takes place under constraints of limited working memory, since the 
beliefs that can serve as supports or warrants must be salient for these processes to use 
them. 
Utterance ucts 
Fig. 4 shows the discourse act schema that provides the basis for dialogue. Discourse 
acts are composed of utterance acts, which are the primitive acts that an agent can 
actually perform. Each discourse act can be performed in different ways by varying the 
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number and type of utterance acts that it consists of. For example, a proposal may or 
may not include additional information that can convince the hearer, as in example (9). 
There are seven utterance act types: OPEN, CLOSE, PROPOSE, ACCEPT, REJECT, 
ASK and SAY, which are realized via the schemas below: 
(Propose ?speaker ?hearer ?option) , 
(Ask ?speaker ?hearer ?belief) , 
(Say ?speaker ?hearer ?belief) , 
(Accept ?speaker ?hearer ?option) , 
(Reject ?speaker ?hearer ?belief) , 
(Reject ?speaker ?hearer ?option) , 
(Open ?speaker ?hearer ?option) , 
(Close ?speaker ?hearer ?intention) . 
The content of each utterance act can be an OPTIONS and INTENTIONS representing a 
domain plan act constructed by means-end reasoning and deliberation as shown in Fig. 
3. An OPTION is an act that has not been committed to by both agents. An INTENTION 
is an act that has been committed to by both agents [ 7,991. An option only becomes 
an intention in the collaborative plan if it is ACCEPTED by both agents, either explicitly 
or implicitly. The option in a REJECT schema is a counter-proposal and what is rejected 
is the current proposal. 
The content of an utterance act may also be a belief. These beliefs are either those 
that an agent starts with, beliefs communicated by the other agent, or inferences made 
by the agent during the conversation. Beliefs in ASK actions have variables that the 
addressee attempts to instantiate. The belief in a rejection schema is a belief that the 
speaker believes is a reason to reject the proposal, such as a belief that the preconditions 
for the option in the proposal do not hold [ 139 1. 
Examples of these utterance acts in dialogue will be given in Section 4. Below how 
B processes each of the seven messages that A can send is specified. In the effects 
specified below, Store means store in AWM, for eventual long-term storage in the beliefs 
database. The processing involved with each incoming message should be understood 
with reference to the IRMA agent architecture. 
(i) Agent A: (Propose ?speaker ?hearer ?option) . 
Agent B: 
(a) Filter: check whether ?option is compatible with current beliefs, e.g. that 
no current beliefs contradict its preconditions. 
(b) Infer and store the preconditions of ?option. 
(c) Means-end reason (ME-reason) about intention the ?option contributes 
to. 
(d) Deliberate by evaluating the ?option against other options generated by 
means-end reasoning. 
(e) Indicate results of deliberation by an accept or reject. 
(ii) Agent A: (Ask ‘?speaker ?hearer ?belief). 
Agent B: Retrieve beliefs matching ?belief from memory and respond with 
(say ?speaker ?hearer ?belief) with the variable instantiated for each matching 
Belief. 
198 
( iii ) 
(iv) 
f vi) 
( vii ) 
( viii) 
Agent A: (Say ‘!speaker ?hearer ?belief). 
Agent B: Store ?beIief. 
Agent A: C Accept ?speaker ?hearer ?option ) . I3 
Agent B: 
(a) Store ( intend A B ?option 1. ” 
( h) Store (act-effects ‘?option )
Agent A: (Reject ‘?speaker ?hearer ?option). 
Agent B: 
(a) Deliberate ?option in comparison with own current proposal that was 
rejected. 
( t-11 Accept ?option it’ better than your current proposal. 
(c) If rejecting ?option then reject with reason for rejection. 
Agent A: (Reject ‘!speaker ?hearer ?belief). 
Agent B: Store ?belief. 
Agent A: (Open ?speaker ?hearer ?option 1. 
Agent B: Mark the discourse segment that matches ?option as open. 
Agent A: (Close ?speaker ?hearer ?intention). 
Agent B: Close the discourse segment for ?intention. 
These acts and their effects determine the structure of the dialogue and its effect on 
the mental state of the converaants. 
3.3. Plati evaluation 
There are three components of the plan evaluation process that have different effects 
on collaborative planning. Two features are related to the task definition and the third 
to the model of evaluation applied: 
(i) 
iii) 
(iii) 
the degree of belief coordination: whether some or all of the itztetztiotzs a sociated 
with a plan must be mutually intended and whether any beliefs related to the 
intended acts must also be mutually believed; 
task determinacy and fault tolerance: whether the task has only one solution, or 
is fault tolerant or more or less satisfiable; 
the model must specify what is to be optimized and whose resource consumption 
is to be minimized for performance evaluation. 
Different theories of collaborative planning reflect different views of the degree of 
belief coordination required for agents have a collaborative plan. The minimal approach 
is to not require the agents to establish mutual beliefs at all [ 35,531. Rather agents 
divide up the plan into subcomponents and separately plan each component, without 
requiring agreement on how the subcomponents are planned. At the next level of belief 
coordination, it is common to require the intended acts of the collaborative plan to be 
mutually intended [51,79, 125, 1271. At the highest level of belief coordination, the 
I7 This ih a simpiitication since the form of the acceptance determines the endorsement type on the mutual 
belief that is added to the beliefs database. 
” This represents that both agents are committed to the option while the binding of the “option specifies the 
agent who will execute the option. 
h4.A. Walker/Artijcial Intelligence 85 (1996) 181-243 199 
agents must both mutually intend all intentions and mutually believe any beliefs that 
support the plan such as the WARRANT beliefs that provide reasons for adopting a step 
of the plan. In addition, it is possible to require that inferences about other goals that 
the intended actions will satisfy should also be mutually believed. 
In this work, the assumption is that the degree of belief coordination required is 
a feature of the task. The minimal level in the experiments discussed below will be 
that all intentions must be mutually intended, and the experiments will vary whether 
WARRANTS, and inferred intentions that are derived from explicitly discussed intentions, 
must also be mutual. 
Task determinacy and fault tolerance have an effect on communicative choice in 
collaborative planning because they are directly related to how much uncertainty is 
tolerable in the plan. If a partial plan has some utility, then making a mistake or only 
constructing a partial plan is not catastrophic. For task determinacy, I assume that a 
measure of the quality of the final plan can be determined from the utility of each step 
in the plan, and that partial plans can also be evaluated, so that the task is more or less 
satisfiable. 
With respect to evaluating performance, I assume that the agents in a collaborative 
planning dialogue are working as a team, and as a team they attempt to optimize the 
team’s performance and minimize the team’s consumption of resources. This follows 
from Clark’s assumption that conversants in dialogue attempt to achieve their dialogue 
purpose with LEAST COLLABORATIVE EFFORT [ 18,21,22]. This approach contrasts 
with other approaches in which agents only participate in communication to the degree 
that it maximizes their own expected utility [ 351. 
A final choice has to do with which processes collaborative effort consists of. A 
common assumption is that the number of utterances is the primary efficiency measure 
[ 15,471; this is the FEWEST UITERANCES ASSUMPTION. Since all types of IRUs 
violate this assumption, in this work collaborative effort is defined with reference to 
the agent architecture and to all the processes required in collaborative planning, i.e. 
( 1) retrieval processes necessary to access previously stored beliefs in memory; (2) 
communicative processes related to generating and interpreting utterances; and (3) 
reasoning processes that operate on beliefs stored in memory and those communicated 
by other agents. With respect to the IRMA architecture (Fig. 3), retrieval processes 
are those that access AWM, the plan library and the beliefs and intentions databases, 
communicative processes are the modules for perception and generation of messages, 
and inferences are the combined processes of deliberation, means-end reasoning, and 
filtering. Collaborative effort includes the costs for both agents for all of these processes: 
COLLABORATIVE EFFORT = (the total cost of communication for both agents) 
+(the total cost of inferences for both agents) 
+( the total cost of retrievals for both agents). 
Collaborative effort is defined for the whole dialogue and not on a per utterance basis. 
This definition and the other assumptions support the specification of the plan evaluation 
process. Given the above definitions, performance is the difference between a measure 
of the quality of the problem solution and COLLABORATIVB EFFORT. 
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PERFORMANCE = QUALITY OF SOLUTION - COLLABORATIVE EFFORT. 
Since the agents’ desires are simply to maximize utility, the quality of the solution is 
measured by the utility of the resulting plan with respect to the agents’ utility functions. 
4. Design-World 
4.1. Methodological basis of Design- World 
Design-World is a testbed for a theory of collaborative communication, which in- 
stantiates the model of collaborative planning in dialogue discussed in Section 3. In 
order to motivate the use of the Design-World testbed in developing and testing a de- 
feasible theory of communication in collaborative planning, this section first describes 
Design-World as an instance of a general method, and then describes the testbed and its 
implementation as well as the task and communication parameters. The method can be 
characterized by the steps below: 
(i) Generate hypotheses about the features of a model of collaborative planning 
dialogues from a statistical analysis of human-human dialogue corpora. 
(ii) Produce a functional characterization of the model, specifically including the 
parameters that could affect task outcome, or claims about the efficacy of the 
model. 
(iii) Implement the model as a testbed so that (some of) these parameters can be 
controlled, while using independently motivated modules for other aspects of 
testbed. 
C iv) Test the hypotheses and the resulting model against different situations controlled 
by parameter settings. 
The hypotheses that were generated by the statistical analysis of the dialogue corpora 
were discussed in Section 2. These hypotheses are roughly that under constraints of 
resource bounds, task inferential complexity, task fault tolerance. and task requirements 
for belief coordination, communicative choices to include IRUs can reduce collaborative 
effort or increase the quality of solution of the collaborative plan. 
The next step is to produce a functional characterization of the model (a partial 
formalization ). In Section 3. I discussed features of a model of collaborative planning 
that interact with an agent’s autonomy. resource limits and communicative choices. In 
non-experimental work, the model is the final result of the research. However, this leaves 
the model and the claims that motivated the model empirically unverified. In formal 
characterizations, many simplifying assumptions need to be made, and it is not always 
clear that the results carry over to complex domains where the simplifying assumptions 
do not hold. While the model presented here is empirically based on statistical analysis 
of a corpus of naturally occurring dialogues, many of the hypotheses discussed above 
are related to models of agents’ processing. Corpus analysis can only provide weak 
support for these hypotheses. Thus another source of empirical verification is desirable 
in order to develop a well-specified and defeasible theory. This is the motivation for the 
Design-World testbed. 
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Next, it is necessary to consider the parameters that could affect the outcome or claims 
about the efficacy of the model and then implement the model as a testbed so that at least 
some of these parameters can be controlled. The use of independently motivated modules 
for other aspects of the testbed guarantees that the testbed actually tests something, and 
also makes it less likely that the testbed is a case of “experimentation in the small” 
1541. 
Parameters that affect the efficacious use of IRUs have already been discussed: these 
include resource bounds, task inferential complexity, and requirements for belief coordi- 
nation. The AWM model introduces a parameter for resource bounds, and is implemented 
as part of the IRMA architecture for resource limited agents, which is independently 
motivated [ 7,991. The AWM model itself is also independently motivated, since it repro- 
duces in simulation many well-known results on human memory and learning [ 76,118]. 
In addition, the utterance acts and their effects are independently motivated by other 
research on collaborative planning dialogues and by the statistical analysis of dialogue 
corpora [ 12,17,106,113,120,127,139,143]. 
To introduce parameters related to tasks, the testbed is designed around a simple task 
where two agents must form a collaborative plan as to how to arrange some furniture 
in the rooms of a two-room house. The task is based on cooperative design tasks used 
for experiments on distributed cooperative work for which a corpus of dialogues was 
available [ 1421. However, the simple task can be varied along three dimensions: ( 1) 
inferential complexity; (2) degree of belief coordination required; (3) tolerance for 
errors and usefulness of partial solutions. 
These three task dimensions represent very different tasks. For example, varying 
the task by increasing inferential complexity provides information on the performance 
of agent communication algorithms in simple versus inferentially complex tasks. The 
dimensions enable us to generalize from the specific task in Design-World to real-world 
tasks. Section 4.2 will introduce the Standard version of the task, and then Section 4.4 
will describe the task variations. 
To introduce parameters related to the interaction of communicative choice with task 
complexity and resource limits, agents are designed so that they vary their communica- 
tion strategies to include or not include IRUs. Section 4.5 will describe the communica- 
tive choice parameters that will be used in the experimental results presented in Section 5. 
The experiments reported in Section 5 will examine the interaction of three factors: 
( 1) resource limits; (2) communicative strategies; and (3) task definition. The exper- 
iments in the testbed have several functions: ( 1) they demonstrate that the model can 
be implemented; (2) they highlight potential flaws in the model; and (3) they pro- 
vide empirical verification of hypotheses about the function of particular communicative 
strategies beyond that provided by corpus analysis and researcher’s intuitions. This sec- 
tion describes the domain, the implementation of the collaborative planning model in 
this domain, the communicative strategies and the task variations. 
4.2. Design- World collaborative planning domain 
In Design-World, two artificial parameterizable agents converse in order to agree on 
the design of the floor plan of a two-room house [ 133,142]. The DESIGN-HOUSE plan 
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requires the agents to agree on how to DESIGN-ROOM-1 and DESIGN-ROOM-T. At 
the beginning of the simulation, both agents know the structure of the DESIGN-HOUSE 
plan and that it requires four furniture items in each room. Each agent has 12 items 
of furniture that can be used in the plan. A potential final collaborative design plan 
negotiated via a (simulated) dialogue is shown in Fig. 5. 
Each furniture item has a value that is used both as a WARRANT to support deliber- 
ation (the utility of an act that is under consideration), and as the basis for calculating 
the QUALITY OF SOLUTION of the final plan. as discussed in Section 3. The values 
on the furniture items range from 10 to 56, and both agents’ furniture items range over 
these values. Since beliefs about these values will be used to test hypotheses about the 
function of IRUs, both agents know the values of all the furniture items at the beginning 
of the dialogue. 
Design-World agents negotiate a collaborative plan following the collaborative plan- 
ning algorithm discussed in Section 3. Each agent carries out means-end reasoning 
about the furniture items that can be used in the design. Means-end reasoning generates 
OPTIONS-these options are the content of PROPOSALS to the other agent to PUT a 
furniture item into a room. This is illustrated by dialogue (12). which includes the 
artificial language that the agents communicate with and a gloss automatically generated 
from that language in italics for part of designing room- I. 
(12) (1) 
(2) 
BILL: First, put the green rug it1 the study. 
( Propose agent-bill agent-kim option- 10: 
put-act (agent-bill green rug room- 1 ) ) 
KIM: Then, let’s put the green lamp itz the study. 
(Propose agent-kim agent-bill option-33: 
put-act (agent-kim green lamp room-l ) ) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
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BILL: Then, let’s put the green couch in the study. 
(Propose agent-bill agent-kim option-45: 
put-act (agent-bill green couch room-l ) ) 
KIM: No, instead let’s put the purple couch in the study. 
(Reject agent-kim agent-bill option-56: 
put-act (agent&m purple couch room- 1) ) 
BILL: PUTTING IN THE GREEN COUCH IS WORTH 56. 
(Say agent-bill agent-kim bel-265: 
score (option-45: put-act (agent-bill green couch room-l) 56)) 
BILL: It is better to put the green couch in the study. 
(Reject agent-bill agent-kim option-56: 
put-act (agent-bill green couch room- 1) ) 
203 
At the beginning of the dialogue, agent-kim has stored in memory the proposition 
that (score green rug 56). When she receives Bill’s proposal as shown in ( 12.1), she 
evaluates that proposal in order to decide whether to accept or reject it. As part of 
evaluating the proposal she will attempt to retrieve the score proposition stored earlier 
in memory. Thus the propositions about the scores of furniture items are WARRANTS 
for supporting deliberation. 
As discussed in Section 3, the agents retain their autonomy even though the agents 
both want to agree on a plan for designing the house. Thus, on receiving a proposal, an 
agent deliberates whether to ACCEPT or REJECT it [ 34,135]. Proposals (1) and (2) 
are inferred to be implicitly ACCEPTED because they are not rejected [ 139,143]. This 
follows from the COLLABORATIVE PRINCIPLE discussed in Section 3. If a proposal is 
ACCEPTED, either implicitly or explicitly, then the option that was the content of the 
proposal becomes a mutual intention that contributes to the final design plan [ 101,113, 
1311. 
Agents REJECT a proposal if deliberation leads them to believe that they know of 
a better option, based on evaluating the utility of the competing options they have 
generated by means-end reasoning. For example, in (12.4) Kim rejects the proposal 
in (12.3), for pursuing option-45, and proposes option-56 instead. The form of the 
rejection as a counter-proposal is based on observations about how rejection is commu- 
nicated in naturally occurring dialogue as codified in the COLLABORATIVE PLANNING 
PRINCIPLES [ 1391. When an agent intends to reject another agent’s rejection, as in 
(12.5) and (12.6), the agent includes additional information to support its proposal. In 
( 12.5), agent-bill reminds agent-kim of the value of the green couch, before rejecting 
agent-kim’s proposal. 
4.3. Agent architecture implementation in Design- World 
The agent architecture used in the Design-World simulation environment is the mod- 
ified IRMA architecture, shown in Fig. 3 and discussed in Section 3 [ 7,991. The only 
aspects of the architecture that are specific to Design-World are the plan library, the way 
that AWM is implemented, and the way that belief deliberation is implemented. 
For the experiments below, the total size of AWM is set to 16, but memory is wrap- 
around, and there is no overwriting. If the path of the memory pointer retraces its steps 
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so that the current memory loci already has something stored in it, the new item is 
simply added. Thus memory capacity is unbounded. 
Since hypothesis A4 relates to the degree to which AWM is limited. we want to 
be able to compare the performance of agents who are more or less attention limited. 
Thus. all experiments make comparisons between different communicative strategies 
over three ranges of AWM settings; the AWM search radius parameter varies from LOW 
AWM (radius of 3 and 4), lo MID AWM (radius of 6 and 7) to HIGH AWM (radius 01 
1 I and 16). LOW AWM agents arc severely attention limited agents, wherease almost 
everything an agent knows is salient for HIGH AWM agents. 
The limits on AWM plays a critical role in determining agents’ performance. Remem- 
bcr that only salierzt beliefs can be used in means-end reasoning and deliberation. so 
that if the warrant for a proposal is not salient, the agent cannot properly evaluate a 
proposal. However, if the agent only knows of one option, the agent can accept the 
proposal on the assumption that any option is better than doing nothing. Section 5 will 
show the impact of resource limits on performance. For more details see [ 76.1351. 
The implementation of belief deliberation. for the purpose of Design-World, was 
tied directly to Landauer’s AWM model. In that model, nothing stored in memory is 
ever deleted or modified. Rather, new beliefs are added which effectively compete with 
beliefs that are already present. Thus an agent’s belief deliberation process depends on 
collecting a set of related beliefs which may be contradictory, and applying an algorithm 
to determine what the agent believes ( see [ 39.431 ) The fact that new information about 
the state of the world supercedes old information is an emergent property of the belief 
retrieval mechanism: beliefs recently added are more likely to be retrieved. However the 
stochastic aspect of retrieval means that it is possible for an agent to decide to believe 
“out-of-date” propositions, and “forget” recent changes in the world. As we will see in 
Section 5, this means that, in casts where the outdated beliefs were encountered with 
greater frequency and thus stored in memory repeatedly, agents who can access all of 
their beliefs are more likely to decide to believe out of date beliefs.” 
The plan library contains domain plans for Design-house and its subgoals, as well 
as discourse plans for the discourse acts shown in Fig. 4. The discourse plans will be 
discussed in detail in Section 4.5. 
1.1. Design- World tasks 
The Design-World task as a plan is simple since it involves linear planning of subgoals 
which contribute to higher level goals. as shown in Fig. 6. However, the task is easily 
modified according to the general task features discussed above so that it is more 
difficult to perform well. These modifications are applicable to other tasks besides the 
testbed task, and affect the degree to which different aspects of the task contribute to 
the performance evaluation. 
I5 It i\ unclear whether this prediction of the belief deliberation algorithm is consistent with human perfor- 
mance. However it is easy to think of examples of humans making the kind of error that this model would 
predict. For example, I commonly believe (falsely) that I have eggs at home in the refrigerator. even though 
I used them the previous evening for quiche 
M.A. Walker/Artijcial Intelligence RS (1996) 181-243 205 
DESIGN HOUSE 
DESIGN ROOM- 1 DESIGN ROOM-Z 
Fig. 6. Standard version of the task, fault tolerant and partial solutions acceptable. 
There are four versions of the task that will be used to test the hypotheses introduced 
in Section 2: Standard, Zero-non-matching-beliefs, Matched-pair, and Zero-invalids. The 
Standard task is inferentially simple, fault tolerant and requires low levels of belief 
coordination. The other tasks are more difficult because they increase the degree of 
belief coordination required, and magnify the effect of mistakes. The Zero-non-matching- 
beliefs and Matched-pair tasks each explore different aspects of belief coordination and 
inferential complexity. The Zero-invalids task is fault intolerant. 
Standard task 
The Standard task provides a baseline and is inferentially simple, fault tolerant and 
requires low levels of belief coordination. The Standard task is defined so that the 
QUALITY OF SOLLJTION for a particular dialogue consists of the sum of all the furniture 
pieces for each valid step in the plan. In addition, the task is defined so that partial 
solutions are possible. Any number of furniture items in a room is a valid plan, rather 
than requiring that each room must have all four furniture items. This choice about task 
determinacy makes it possible to see the gradient effect on performance of different 
resource restrictions. 
In addition the Standard task is fault tolerant. If agents make a mistake in planning 
and insert invalid steps in their collaborative plan, the point values for invalid steps in 
the plan are simply subtracted from the score. Thus in the Standard task agents are 
not heavily penalized for making mistakes due to inserting steps in plans that are not 
actually executable. 
The Standard task is inferentially simple because the agent’s only inferences are 
those by means-end reasoning to generate options, those by deliberation to evaluate 
options, and act-effect inferences after committing to an action. Each of these inferences 
relies on one premise: the premise (has ?agent ?item) supports means-end reasoning, 
the premise (score ?item ?score) supports deliberation, and the premise (intend A B 
?option) supports inferring the effect of ?option. Thus, none of these processes requires 
multiple premises to be simultaneously salient. However, it is possible to test hypotheses 
about processing effort in the Standard task by making it easier to access these inferential 
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Fig. 7. Tasks can differ as to the level of tnutual beliet required. Some tasks require that W. a reason for 
doing I? is mutually believed and others don‘t. 
premises. It is also possible to test the effect of resource limits since these premises 
must be accessible to perform optimally on the task. 
The degree of belief coordination in the Standard task is low because agents are 
only required to coordinate on the intentions corresponding to put-acts as shown in 
Fig. 6. These intentions are always explicitly discussed so that coordination is always 
achieved. 
The Zero-non-nzatchitlg-hrlirj~ task 
The Zero-non-matching-beliefs task increases the degree of belief coordination by 
requiring agents to base their deliberation process on the same beliefs. They must have 
the same WARRANTS for adopting an intention in order to do well on this task. Fig. 7 
shows the structure of beliefs about intentions and warrants for the Design-house goal. 
In the Zero-non-matching-beliefs task, as shown, the warrants underlying intentions must 
also be mutually believed. This is not generally required in forming a collaborative plan 
because agents A and B can mutually believe that they have maximized utility without 
necessarily agreeing on what that utility is. Furthermore, in the general case, when 
agents have only one option under consideration. they do not need to evaluate the utility 
of that one option in order to decide whether to accept or reject it. 
The Zero-non-matching-beliefs task provides a basis for testing hypotheses Al and 
AS, introduced in Section 2 by increasing the degree of belief coordination required to 
perform well on the task, where the beliefs are those used in deliberation. 
The Zero-non-matching-beliefs task models particular types of real-world tasks since 
it is not always necessary for agents to agree on the reasons for carrying out a particular 
action. For example, in the negotiation between the union and the management of a 
company, any agreement that is reached is agreed to by each party for different reasons. 
An agreement for a shorter work week is supported by the union because more overtime 
pay is possible for those who want to work more and is supported by the management 
because the company’s insurance premiums will be lower. However, if two agents agree 
on a plan, but have different reasons for doing so, they may change their beliefs and 
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Fig. 8. Making additional inferences: Matched-pair-two-room task. Each PUT intention contributes both to a 
Design-room goal as well as a Matched-pair goal. 
their intentions under different conditions. The most stable, long-term, collaborative 
plans will be those in which agents agree on both the actions to be performed, as 
well as the reasons for doing those actions. Under these conditions the agents will be 
more likely to revise their intentions in a compatible way and intention revision should 
be simpler. Thus the Zero-non-matching-beliefs task examines one extreme of belief 
coordination for deliberation. 
Matched-pair tasks 
Another aspect of belief coordination has to do with coordinating beliefs based on 
inferences. There are two task definitions that increase inferential complexity by in- 
creasing the number of independent premises that must be simultaneously available in 
working memory. These are: ( 1) Matched-pair-same-room, and (2) Matched-pair-two- 
room. Fig. 8 shows the Matched-pair-two-room version of the task. Each intention to 
PUT a furniture item in a room can potentially contribute to another intention of achiev- 
ing a matched pair goal. A Matched-pair is two furniture items of the same color. The 
inference of a Matched-pair is based on the minor premises shown in (13): 
( 13) (a) (Intend A B (Put ?agent ?item-1 ?room-1 ) ) 
(b) (Intend A B (Put ?agent ?item-2 ?room-2)) 
(c) (Equal (Color ?item-I ) (Color ?item-2) ) 
Making this inference is more demanding for resource limited agents than the processing 
needed in the Standard task. In the Standard task, in order to agree on one step of 
the plan, the agents must access at least one belief about a furniture item they have 
available. In order to properly evaluate the option represented by that furniture item 
they must access the w ARRANT for that option. In contrast, in both Matched-pair 
tasks, the WAFZRANT for both beliefs must be accessed for both furniture items that 
could contribute to a Matched-pair goal. In addition, the premises in (13) must also be 
accessed, and furthermore, each version of the Matched-pair task requires one additional 
premise. 
i i 
Fig. 9. In Zero-invalids task. invalid steps invalidate he whole plan 
The difference in the two Matched-pair tasks is whether the matches are in the 
same or different rooms. Matched-pair-same-room requires the additional premise that 
(Equal ?room- 1 ?room-2) while Matched-pair-two-room requires the additional premise 
that NOT (Equal ?room-1 ?room-2). Because premise ( 13a) is inferred and stored in 
memory at the time that a proposal is accepted, and because the agents always complete 
one room before starting another, the necessary premise shown in ( 13a) is more likely 
to be salient in the Matched-pair-same-room task. 
As discussed in Sections I and 7, WC wish to provide a test of hypothesis A2, the 
discourse inference constraint, and examine how it affects the coordination of inference 
in collaborative planning. Hypotheses A3 and A5 together imply that the complexity of 
inference should interact with the agent’s ability to stay coordinated on inferences. Since 
our measure of inferential complexity is the number of independent premises required 
to draw an inference, both the Matched-pair-same-room task and the Matched-pair-two- 
room task increase inferential complexity. 
Evaluating the QUALITY of: SOLUTION for the Matched-pair tasks reflects the em- 
phasis on coordinating on inferences, since both Matched-pair tasks require that both 
agents make the Matched-pair inferences in order to score points for matched pairs. The 
task measures how well agents are coordinated on the inferred intentions that follow 
from the intentions that were explicitly agreed upon. Only the intentions that contribute 
to Matched-pair are counted in the final solution. and the utility of these intentions is 
the sum of the utilities of the two furniture items, plus the utility of the Matched-pair 
(50 points). 
Zero-itlvalids task 
The Zero-invalids task is fault intolerant (see Fig. 9). The assumption in the Zero- 
invalids task is that any mistake invalidates the whole plan. This is a feature of task 
determinacy: while there are still many possible 8 step plans, all of the solutions with 
less than 8 items that would be counted as valid solutions for the Standard task are not 
valid solutions for the Zero-invalids task. 
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This task is an example of one extreme of fault intolerance. In general, how fault 
tolerant a task is depends on the interdependency of different subparts of the problem 
solution. For some tasks, a mistake can invalidate the whole solution, for other tasks, 
partial solutions without the invalid step may be adequate. For example, in a task like 
furnishing a room it may be desirable to have both a couch and a chair, but if the agents 
make a mistake and assume they can use a chair that will end up in a different room, 
the room is still partially furnished and usable. On the other hand, in a task such as 
building a tower, each step depends on the successful execution of the previous step 
and the whole plan may be invalid if a step to put down a foundation block cannot be 
executed. 
Note that an agent can reject another agent’s proposal based on believing that it would 
add an invalid step to the plan, as shown in the rejection utterance act schema in Section 
3.2. Since agents have to agree on each step of the plan, an invalid step can only be 
inserted into the plan if both agents have failed to remember that the preconditions for 
the plan do not hold. 
4.5. Varying communicative strategies 
Section 3 discussed the discourse act schema that controls how agents participate in 
dialogue, and discussed the types of utterance acts that the discourse acts are composed 
of. Which utterance acts a discourse act decomposes into depends on COMMUNICATIVE 
STRATEGIES which codify different communicative choices for how to do a particular 
discourse action. Agents are parameterized for different communicative strategies by 
placing different expansions of discourse plans in their plan libraries. 
Varying an agent’s communicative strategies provides the basis for testing the hypothe- 
ses about the potential benefits of IRUs. Varying the degree of explicitness of a discourse 
act is the basis of the four communicative strategies tested below: (1) All-implicit; (2) 
Close-consequence; (3) Explicit-warrant; and (4) Matched-pair-inference-explicit. All 
of these strategies are hypothesized to mitigate agents’ attentional and inferential resource 
limits, under the assumptions about their architecture and the definition of quality of 
solution for the task. 
Figs. lo-13 show a plan operator for each strategy. These operators draw on work 
by Walker and Rambow [ 1381, and also make use of Moser and Moore’s definitions of 
discourse acts and the integration of rhetorical structure theory (RST) and Grosz and 
Sidner’s theory of discourse [50,89,93,94]. The predicates in the plan operators are 
precisely defined by the collaborative planning model and agent architecture discussed 
in Section 3. Each discourse act, such as a proposal, is composed of a CORE act which 
represents the primary purpose of the act such as a propose utterance act, as well as a 
CONTRIBUTOR act, such as a warrant, whose purpose is to increase the likelihood of 
achieving the intention of the core [ 92,145,146]. 
All-implicit strategy 
The All-implicit strategy is an expansion of a discourse plan to make a PROPOSAL, 
in which a PROPOSAL decomposes trivially to the communicative act of PROPOSE. See 
the plan operator in Fig. 10. This strategy is the communicative choice shown in (3) 
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NAME: Proposal-All-implicit (?speaker, ?hearer, ?act) 
EFFECT: (desire ‘?hearer (do ?hearer ?act) ?utility-act) 
CONSTRAINTS: (and (option ?act) 
(salient ?hearer (utility ?act ?utility-act) ) ) 
CORE: (propose ?speaker ?hearer ?act ) 
Fig. IO. The IJKOPOSAI. plan operator tbr an All-implicit agent 
in Section 1, and provides a baseline strategy that is consistent with the REDUNDANCY 
CONSTRAINT. The experiments below will compare the performance of agents using the 
All-implicit strategy with the performance of agents using the other proposal strategies 
discussed below. 
In dialogue ( 12) in Section 4.1. both Design-World agents communicate using the 
All-implicit strategy, and the proposals are shown in utterances ( I ). (2). and (3). As 
Fig. IO shows, the All-implicit strategy includes no additional information in proposals. 
leaving it up to the other agent to retrieve them from memory. 
The constraints on using the All-implicit strategy are that ( I ) the proposed ?act is 
an OPTION generated by means-end reasoning and (2) that the utility is SALIENT 
to the hearer. In the experiments below, agents are parameterized to use this strategy 
consistently, so that an agent using the All-implicit strategy assumes everything the 
hearer knows is always salient. The effect of the proposal is that the hearer will evaluate 
that proposal and deliberate the degree to which the hearer desires the act. However, 
whether the hearer will accept or reject the proposal depends on other options the hearer 
knows about. Clearly the speaker cannot predict these other options. Thus the effect of 
the proposal does not specify that the action will be intended by the hearer. This holds 
for all proposal operators. 
The All-implicit strategy can be used by agents in any of the Design-World tasks 
discussed in Section 4.4, since the agents are capable of making inferences or accessing 
memory to fill in what has been left implicit with this strategy. Other inferences drawn 
by the hearer from the proposal utterance act are not shown in Fig. IO. For example, 
an agent can use the All-implicit strategy in tither of the Matched-pair tasks, leaving 
it up to the other agent to infer which other intention makes a match with the option 
currently under consideration. 
Close-consequence 
In dialogue ( 14). agent CLC uses the Close-consequence strategy. The plan operator 
for this strategy is shown in Fig. I I. The core of the strategy is explicit CLOSING 
statements, such as C I4.2), on the completion of the intention associated with a discourse 
segment. A contributor to CLC’s CLOSING discourse act is an IRU such as ( 14.3) : CLC 
makes the inference explicit that since they have agreed on putting the green rug in the 
study, they no longer have the green rug (act-effect inference). 
( 14) ( 1) BILL: Then. let’s put [he greetz rug in the study. 
(Propose agent-bill agent-clc option-30: 
put-act (agent-bill green rug room- I ) ) 
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NAME: 
EFFECT: 
CONSTRAINTS: 
CONTRIBUTOR: 
CORE: 
Close-consequence ( ?speaker,?hearer,?act) 
(and (salient ?hearer (effect ?act ?effect) ) 
(be1 ?hearer (closed-segment ?act) ) ) 
(and (intend ?speaker ?hearer ?act) 
(open-segment ?act) ) 
(say ?speaker ?hearer (effect ?act ?effect) ) 
(close ?speaker ?hearer ?act) 
(2) CLC: So, we’ve agreed to put the green rug in the study. 
(Close agent-clc agent-bill intended-30: 
put-act (agent-bill green rug room- 1) ) 
(3) CLC: AND WE NO LONGER HAVE GREEN RUG. 
(Say agent-clc agent-bill bel-48: hasn’t (agent-bill green rug) ) 
Fig. Il. The CLOSING plan operator for a Close-consequence agent. 
The Close-consequence strategy of making inferences explicit at the close of a segment 
models the naturally occurring example in Section 2.2. In both cases an inference is 
made explicit that follows from what has just been said, and the inference is sequentially 
located at the close of a discourse segment. This strategy can be used by agents in any 
of the Design-World tasks discussed in Section 4.4. 
The Close-consequence strategy will be used to test hypothesis C2 about potential 
benefits of making inferences explicit, and will be contrasted with the All-implicit 
strategy where no closing acts are produced. Note in dialogue (12) in Section 4.2 that 
both the agents go on to the next phase of the plan, leaving the infererategy will be 
used to test hypothesis C2 about potential benefits of making inferences explicit, and 
will be contrasted with the All-implicit strategy where no closing acts are produced. 
Note in dialogue (12) in Section 4.2 that both the agents go on to the next phase of 
the plan, leaving the inference of both acceptance and closing for the other agent to 
make. However, Close-consequence is not a good test of other hypotheses because in 
the experiments both agents always make act-effect inferences, and these inferences are 
not difficult to make. See [ 1371 for a discussion of experiments which vary an agent’s 
capability to make these inferences. 
Explicit-warrant 
The Explicit-warrant strategy varies the proposal discourse act by including WAR- 
RANT IRUs in each proposal. The plan operator is given in Fig. 12 and exemplified by 
the dialogue excerpt in (15). Remember that a WARRANT for an intention is a reason 
for adopting the intention, and here WARRANTS are the score propositions that give the 
utility of the proposal, which are mutually believed at the outset of the dialogues. In 
(15), the WARRANT IRU in (15.1) contributes to the proposal (core act) in (15.2). 
( 15) ( 1) IEI: PUTTING IN THE GREEN RUG IS WORTH 56. 
(Say agent-iei agent-iei2 bel-2: 
score (option-2: put-act (agent-iei green rug room-l) 56) ) 
NAME: Proposal-Explicit-warrant (?speaker, ?hearer, ?act) 
EFFECT: (and (desire ?hearer (do ‘?hearer ?act) ?utility-act) 
( salient ?hearer ( utility ?act ?utility-act) ) ) 
CONSTRAINTS: ( and (option ?act ) 
C not-salient ?hearer (utility ?act ?utility-act) ) ) 
CONTRIBUTOR: ( say ?speaker ?hearer (utility ?act ?utility-act) ) 
CORE: ( propose ?speaker ?hearer ?act ) 
Fig. I?. The I’KOPOSAI. plan oprralor for an Explicit-warrant agent. 
( 2 ) IEI: Thelen, let’s put the greet1 rug in the study. 
(Propose agent-iei agent-iei2 option-2: 
put-act (agent-iei green rug room-l ) ) 
The plan operator in Fig. 12 specilies that an effect of using this plan is that the 
utility of the proposal option is salient. Since warrants are used by the other agent 
in deliberation, the Explicit-warrant strategy can save the other agent the processing 
involved with determining which facts are relevant for deliberation and retrieving them 
from memory. A constraint on using the Explicit-warrant plan operator is that the utility 
of the proposal act is not already salient. 
In the experiments below. agents are parameterized to use this strategy consistently, 
with the result that an agent using the Explicit-warrant strategy assumes that the warrant 
is never salient for the hearer. See 1641 for experiments in which an agent attempts to 
maintain a dynamic model of what is salient for the other agent. The Explicit-warrant 
strategy also occurs in natural dialogues as shown in the naturally occurring example in 
dialogue C 2). 
This strategy can be used by agents in any of the Design-World tasks discussed 
in Section 4.4. The Explicit-warrant strategy provides a test of hypothesis Al: agents 
produce Attention IRUs to support the processes of deliberating beliefs and intentions. 
It can also be used to test hypothesis A4: the choice to produce an Attention IRU 
is related to the degree to which an agent is resource limited in attentional capacity. 
In the Standard task this is predicted to improve the performance of resource limited 
agents. In the Zero-non-matching beliefs task this strategy should increase the likeli- 
hood that agents coordinate their beliefs about the warrants underlying different plan 
steps. 
The Matched-pair-inference-explicit strateg 
The Matched-pair-inference-explicit strategy expands the PROPOSAL discourse act 
to two communicative acts. See Fig. 13. The contributor of the proposal consists of 
statement about what is already intended, while the core is a propose utterance act, as 
in (16.6) followed by (16.7) in one turn: ih 
” The names of agents who use the Matched-pair-inference-explicit strategy are a numbered version of the 
string “IMI” which stands for Implicit acceptance, matched inference. 
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NAME: 
EFFECT: 
CONSTRAINTS: 
Proposal-matched-pair ( ?speaker, ?hearer, ?act 1) 
(and (desire ?hearer (do ?hearer ?actl ) ?utility-act) 
(salient ?hearer (intend ?speaker ?hearer ?act2) ) ) 
(and (option ?act 1) 
(matched-pair ?act 1 ?acd) 
(salient ?hearer (utility ?act 1 ?utility-act) ) ) 
(not (salient ?hearer (intend ?speaker ?hearer ?acd))) 
CONTRIBUTOR: (say ?speaker ?hearer (intend ?speaker ?hearer ?acd)) 
CORE: (propose ?speaker ?hearer ?act 1) 
Fig. 13. The PROPOSAL plan operator for a Matched-pair-inference-explicit agent. 
( 16) (6) IM12: WE AGREED TO PUT THE PURPLE COUCH IN THE STUDY. 
(Say agent-imi2 agent-imi intended-5 1: 
put-act (agent-imi2 purple couch room-l ) ) 
(7) IM12: Then, let’s put the purple rug in the living room. 
(Propose agent-imi2 agent-imi option-SO: 
put-act (agent-imi2 purple rug room-2) ) 
The statement in (16.6) is an IRU, because it realizes information previously inferred 
by both agents, and models the IRU in dialogue ( 11) . Matched-pair-inference-explicit 
is the variation discussed in Section 1 in choice (4). This strategy is only intended to be 
used in the Matched-pair tasks as a way of testing hypothesis A2, the discourse inference 
constraint. As Fig. 13 shows, a constraint on using this plan is that the speaking agent 
has inferred a Matched-pair for the option being proposed. 
Although this strategy is specifically tied to Matched-pair inferences, it provides a 
test of a general strategy for making premises for inferences salient, in tasks that are 
inferentially complex, and which also require agents to remain coordinated on infer- 
ences. For example, to generalize this strategy to other cases of plan-related inferences, 
the clauses for (Matched-pair ?actl ?act2) could be replaced with the more general 
(Generates ?act 1 A ?acd ?act3), where the generates relation is to be inferred [ 33,971. 
Note that the effect of using this strategy is not that the hearer makes the Matched- 
pair inference, rather the effect is that the premise for the desired inference is salient. 
A constraint on using this strategy is that this premise is not already salient. However, 
agents parameterized with this strategy always assume that the premise is not salient 
for the hearer. See [64] for experiments in which agents attempt to maintain a dynamic 
model of the other agent’s attentional state. 
4.6. Plan evaluation 
Section 3.3 specified a model of how collaborative plans are evaluated in terms of 
QUALITY OF SOLUTION and COLLABORATIVE EFFORT. Design-World is constructed 
in order to be able to measure the quality of a solution as well as collaborative effort. 
Section 4.4 defined quality of solution for all of the Design-World tasks. We want to 
examine trade-offs in performance between strategy choices. 
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It is obvious that these trade-offs can be related to the relative contributions of 
total cost of communication versus the total cost of inference versus the total cost of 
retrieval for both agents’ collaborative effort. Thus, to calculate collaborative effort, we 
cannot simply add up the number of retrievals, inferences and messages. Consider that 
a Consequence IRU that makes an inference explicit ensures that an inferred belief 
becomes part of the discourse model. However, if the inference would have been made 
anyway, the benefit of the strategy is dependent upon whether the effort to make the 
inference without the Consequence IRU would have been greater than the cost of 
processing the extra utterance of the Consequence IRU. A similar argument holds for 
the potential benefit of Attention IRUs. Whenever an Attention IRU reduces overall 
effort for retrieval while not increasing communication effort to the same degree, it will 
be beneficial. This hypothesis is given below in a general form. 
l HYPOTH-I 1: Strategies that reduce collaborative effort without affecting quality 01 
solution are beneficial. 
This hypothesis follows directly from the definition of performance repeated here for 
convenience from Section 3.3: 
PERFORMANCE = QUALITY OF SOLIJTION - COLLABORATIVE EFFORT. 
We need to introduce parameters for the effort involved with each of the component 
processes because they are not strictly comparable, and because these modules are 
implementation dependent. Thus agents’ retrieval, inference and communicative costs 
are parameterized by ( 1) COMMCOST: cost of sending a message; (2) INFCOST: cost 
of inference; and ( 3) RETCOST: cost of retrieval from memory. Collaborative effort is 
then defined as: 
COLLABORATIVE EFFORT= (COMMCOST x total messages for both agents) 
+(INFCOST x total inferences for both agents) 
+ (RETCOST x total retrievals for both agents). 
We will use these cost parameters to explore three extremes in this space: ( 1) when 
processing is free; (2) when retrieval effort dominates other processing costs; and (3) 
when communication effort dominates other processing costs. The parameters support 
modeling various instantiations of the agent architecture given in Fig. 3. For example, 
varying the cost of retrieval models different assumptions about how the beliefs database, 
plan library and working memory are implemented. Varying the cost of communication 
models situations in which communication planning is very costly. The relation between 
the values of these parameters and the utilities of the steps in the plan determines 
experimental outcomes. rather than the absolute values. 
As an example of the effect of varying these costs, consider the plots of performance 
distributions shown in Figs. 14 and 1.5 for LOW, MID and HIGH AWM. In these figures, 
performance is plotted on the x-axis and number of simulations at that performance level 
are given by bars on the y-axis. The performance distributions in Fig. 14 demonstrate 
the increase in QUALITY OF SOLUTION that we would expect with increases in AWM, 
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Fig. 14. Performance distributions showing the effect of AWM parameterization for dialogues between two 
All-implicit agents when all processing is free. The three performance distributions are for LOW, MID and 
HIGH AWM agent% 
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Fig. 15. Performance distributions showing the effect of increased retrieval cost for each AWM range for 
dialogues between two All-implicit agents. The three performance distributions are for LOW, MID and HIGH 
AWM agents. retcost = 0.001. 
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given no processing costs. I7 Fig 15 shows what happens when processing is not free: . 
here a retrieval cost of 0.001 means that every memory access reduces quality of solution 
by I/ 1000 of a point (remember that the utilities of plan steps range between 10 and 
56). As Fig. 15 shows, the ability to access the whole beliefs database in reasoning 
does not always improve performance since HIGH AWM agents perform similarly to 
MID AWM agents. 
21.7. Summuc: mupping from naturully ocwrring data to Design- World experiments 
Section 2 proposed hypotheses about the function of IRUs in human to human col- 
laborative planning dialogues. and then Section 3 presented a model for collaborative 
planning dialogues based on the observations in Section 2. Section 4 then described 
Design-World as a testbed of the model. and Sections 4.4 and 4.5 introduced a number 
of parameters of the testbed that are intended to model the features of the human-human 
dialogues and support testing of the hypotheses. Here I wish to summarize the mapping 
between the naturally occurring dialogues and the design of the testbed in order to 
clarify the basis for the experiments in the next section. 
The testbed and the experimental parameters are based on the following mapping be- 
tween human-human collaborative planning dialogues and the testbed. First, the planning 
and deliberation aspects of human processing are modeled with the IRMA architecture, 
and resource limits on these processes are modeled by extending the IRMA architecture 
with a model of attention/working memory CAWM) which has been shown to model 
a limited but critical set of properties of human processing. Second, the processing of 
dialogue is tied to the agent architecture. Third, the mapping of a WARRANT relation 
between an act and a belief in naturally occurring examples such as (9) is modeled 
with a WARRANT relation between an act and a belief in Design-World as seen in the 
Explicit-warrant communication strategy in Section 4.5. Fourth, the mapping assumes 
that arbitrary content-based inferences in natural dialogues such as that discussed in 
relation to example t I 1) can be mapped to content-based inferences in Design-World 
such as those required for doing well on the Matched-pair tasks. Fifth, the mapping is 
based on the assumption that task difficulty in naturally occurring tasks such as those in 
the financial advice domain can be related to three abstract features: ( 1 ) inferential com- 
plexity as measured by the number of premise required for making an inferences; (3) 
degree of belief coordination required on intentions, inferences and beliefs underlying a 
plan; and (3) task determinacy and fault tolerance. Finally the mapping assumes that 
it is reasonable to evaluate the performance of the agents in collaborative planning dia- 
logues by using domain plan utility for a measure of the quality of solution and defining 
the cost to achieve that solution as collaborative effort, appropriately parameterized. 
” These distributions approximate Beta distributions [ I44 1, and this approximation was used to determine 
that 200 runs would guarantee stable results. The Beta distribution with the largest variance, for parameters R 
and S greater than or equal to I. is the uniform distribution. This largest variance distribution would require 
approximately 133 samples [ I IS, 144 1. An empirical evaluation of the adequacy of this sample size for three 
different strategies was tested to see if any differences showed up in alternate runs of 100: no differences 
were found. 
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The details of this mapping specifies how the testbed implements the model of collab- 
orative planning and provides the basis for extrapolating from the testbed experimental 
results to the human-human dialogues that are being modeled. The testbed provides an 
excellent environment for testing the hypotheses to the extent that the model captures 
critical aspects of human-human dialogues. 
5. Experimental results 
5.1. Statistically evaluating performance 
The experiments examine the interaction between tasks, communication strategies 
and AWM resource limits. Every experiment varies AWM over three ranges: LOW, 
MID, and HIGH. In order to run an experiment on a particular communicative strategy 
for a particular task, 200 dialogues for each AwM range are simulated. Because the 
AwM model is probabilistic, each dialogue simulation has a different result. The AWM 
parameter yields a performance distribution for very resource limited agents (LOW), 
agents hypothesized to be similar to human agents (MID), and resource unlimited 
agents (HIGH). Sample performance distributions for QUALITY OF SOLUTION (with 
no collaborative effort subtracted) from runs of two All-implicit agents for each AWM 
setting are shown in Fig. 14. 
To test our hypotheses, we want to compare the performance of two different com- 
municative strategies for a particular task, under different asssumptions about resource 
limits and processing costs. To see the effect of communicative strategy and AWM over 
the whole range of AWM settings, we first run a two-way analysis of variance (anova) 
with AWM as one factor and communication strategy as another. ‘* The anova tells us 
whether: (1) AWM alone is a significant factor in predicting performance; (2) commu- 
nication strategy alone is a significant factor in predicting performance; and (3) whether 
there is an interaction between communication strategy and AWM. 
However, anova alone does not enable us to determine the particular Awh4 range at 
which a communication strategy aids or hinders performance, and many of the hypothe- 
ses about the benefits of particular communication strategies are specific to how resource 
limited an agent is. Furthermore, whenever strategy affects performance positively for 
one value of AWM and negatively for another value of AwM, the potential effects of 
strategy cannot be seen from the anova alone. Therefore, we conduct planned compar- 
isons of strategies using the modified Bonferroni test (hereafter MB) [ 701, within each 
AWM range setting to determine which AWM range the strategy affects [ 25, TO]. I9 On 
the basis of these comparisons we can say whether a strategy is BENEFICIAL for a 
particular task for a particular AWM range. 
‘s The experimental performance distributions are not normal and the variance is not the same over different 
samples, however anova is robust against he violation of these assumptions under the conditions in these 
experiments [ 25,701. 
I’) According to the modified Bonferroni test, the significant F values for the planned comparisons reported 
below are 3.88 for p < 0.05, 5.06 for p < 0.025, 6.66 for p < 0.01, and 9.61 for p < 0.002. 
21x 
A strategy A is BENEFICIAL as compared to a strategy B, for a particular AWM 
range, in the same task situation, with the same cost settings, if the mean of A is 
significantly greater than the mean of B. according to the modified Bonferroni test 
(MB) test. 
The converse 01‘ BENEFICIAL is DETRIMEN~‘AL: 
A strategy A is DETRIMENTAL. ;IS compared to a strategy B. for LI particular AWM 
range. in the same task situation, with the same cost settings. if the mean of A 
is significantly less than the mean of B. according to the modified Bonferroni test 
( MB ) test. 
Strategies riced not be tither BENEFIC‘IAL, or DETRIMENTAL. there may be no dif- 
ference between two strategies. Also with the definition given above a strategy may be 
both BENEFICIAL and DETRIMENTAL depending on the range of AWM that the two 
strategies are compared over. i.e., a strategy may be beneficial for LOW AWM agents 
and detrimental for HIGH AWM agents. 
A DIFFERENCE PLOT such as that in Fig. 16 is used to summarize a comparison of 
two strategies, strategy 1 and strategy 2. In the comparisons below, strategy 1 is either 
Close-consequence, *O Explicit-warrant. or Matched-pair-inference-explicit and strategy 
2 is the All-implicit strategy. DiJfemrzces in performance means between two strategies 
are plotted on the y-axis against AWM ranges on the x-axis. Each point in the plot 
represents the difference in the means of 200 runs of each strategy at a particular AWM 
range. These plots summarize the information from 1200 simulated dialogues. 
5.2. Standcud task 
Remember that the Standard task is defined so that the QUALITY OF SOLUTION that 
agents achieve for a DESIGN-HOUSE plan, constructed via the dialogue, is the sum of 
the utilities of each valid step in their plan. The task has multiple correct solutions 
and is fault tolerant because the point values for invalid steps in the plan are simply 
subtracted from the score, with the effect that agents are not heavily penalized for making 
mistakes. Furthermore, the task has low inferential complexity: the only inferences agents 
are required to make are those for deliberation and means-end reasoning. In both of 
these cases, to make these inferences. agents are only required to access a single minor 
premise. 
All-implicit agents do fairly well at the Standard task, under assumptions that all 
processing is free, as shown in the performance plot in Fig. 14. However, as retrieval 
costs increase, HIGH AWM agents don’t do as well as when retrieval is free, because 
they expend too much effort on retrieval during collaborative planning. Compare the 
HIGH AWM distribution in Fig. 14 with that in Fig. 15. Thus for the Standard task, 
HIGH AWM agents have the potential to benefit from communication strategies that 
?‘) In experiments with Close-consequence only one agent in a dialogue uses the Close-consequence strategy 
because the use of this strategy is constrained to when the dialogue segment is open. See Fig. 1 I. Since only 
one agent will ever produce a closing statement for any dialogue segment, only one agent is given the option 
in the simulations. 
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reduce the total effort for retrieval, when retrieval is not free. In addition, although 
the task has minimal inferential complexity, easy access to information that is used 
for deliberation, which the Explicit-warrant strategy provides, could benefit LOW AWM 
agents, since they might otherwise make non-optimal decisions. Furthermore, although 
the task is fault tolerant, agents are still penalized for making errors since errors do 
not contribute to performance. Thus for the Standard task, communication strategies 
such as Close-consequence that can reduce the number of errors could be beneficial. 
Below we will compare the All-implicit strategy to the Explicit-warrant strategy and the 
Close-consequence strategy. 
Explicit-warrant 
The Explicit-warrant strategy can be used in the Standard task to test hypothesis 
Al: agents produce Attention IRUs to support the processes of deliberating beliefs and 
intentions. It can also be used to test hypothesis A4: the choice to produce an Attention 
IRU is related to the degree to which an agent is resource limited in attentional capacity. 
Thus one prediction is that the Explicit-warrant strategy will result in higher performance 
for LOW AWM agents even when processing is free by ensuring that they can access 
the warrant and use it in deliberation, thus making better decisions. 
Fig. 16 plots the differences in the performance means between the Explicit-warrant 
strategy and the All-implicit strategy for LOW, MID and HIGH AWM agents. A two-way 
anova exploring the effect of AWM and the Explicit-warrant strategy for the Standard task 
shows that AWM has a large effect on performance (F = 336.63, p < 0.000001). There 
is no main effect for communicative strategy (F = 1.92, p < 0.16). However, there is 
an interaction between AWM and communicative choice (F = 1136.34, p < 0.000001). 
By comparing performance within a particular AWM range for each strategy we can 
see which AWh4 settings interact with communicative strategy. The planned comparisons 
using the modified Bonferonni (MB) test show that the Explicit-warrant strategy is 
neither beneficial nor detrimental in the Standard task, in comparison with the All- 
implicit strategy, if all processing is free (MB(LOW) = 0.29, ns; MB(MID) = 2.79, ns; 
MB(HIGH) = 0.39, ns). Note that there is a trend towards the Explicit-warrant strategy 
being detrimental at MID AWM. 
The hypothesis based on the corpus analysis was that LOW AWh4 agents might 
benefit from communicative strategies that include IRUs. However, this hypothesis is 
disconfirmed. Further analysis of this result suggests a hypothesis not apparent from the 
corpus analysis: any beneficial effect of an IRU can be cancelled for resource limited 
agents because IRUs may displace other information from working memory that is more 
useful. In this case, despite the fact that the warrant information is useful for deliberation, 
making the warrant salient displaces information that can be used to generate other 
options. When agents are very resource limited making an optimal decision is not as 
important as being able to generate multiple options. 
The Explicit-warrant strategy can also be used in the Standard task to test hypothesis 
11: strategies that reduce collaborative effort overall may be beneficial. Thus, another 
prediction is that by providing the warrant used in deliberating a proposal with every 
proposal, the Explicit-warrant strategy has the potential to reduce resource consumption 
when accessing memory has some processing cost. 
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Fig. 16. If processing is free. Explicit-warrant is neither beneficial nor detrimental for all AWM settings: strategy 
I of two Explicit-warrant agents and strategy 7- of two All-implicit agents: task = Standard, commcost = 0. 
infcost = 0, retcost = 0. 
cost - iei-iei2 bill-kim C= 1 , I = 1 , R = 0.01 
Fig. 17. Explicit-warrant is beneficial for MID and HIGH AWM agents when retrieval dominates processing 
costs: strategy 1 is two Explicit-warrant agents and strategy 2 is two Ail-implicit agents: task = Standard, 
commcost = I. infcost = I. retcost = 0.0 I. 
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Fig. 17 plots the differences in the performance means between the Explicit-warrant 
strategy and the All-implicit strategy for LOW, MID and HIGH AWM agents when 
retrieval effort dominates processing. A two-way anova exploring the effect of AM 
and the Explicit-warrant strategy for the Standard task, when retrieval cost dominates 
processing, shows that AWM has a large effect on performance (F = 330.15, p < 
0.000001). There is also a main effect for communicative strategy (F = 5.74, p < 
O.Ol), and an interaction between AWM and communicative choice (F = 1077.64, 
p < 0.000001). 
The planned comparisons using the MB test to compare performance at each AWM 
range show that, in the Standard task, in comparison with the All-implicit strategy, 
the Explicit-warrant strategy is neither beneficial nor detrimental for LOW AWM agents 
(MB(LOW) = 0.27, ns). However, hypothesis 11 is confirmed because the Explicit- 
warrant strategy is beneficial for MID AWM agents (MB(MID) = 86.43, p < 0.002). 
The Explicit-warrant strategy also tends towards improving performance for HIGH AWM 
agents ( MB(HIGH) = 2.07, p < 0.10). For higher AWM values, this trend is because the 
beliefs necessary for deliberating the proposal are made available in the current context 
with each proposal, so that agents don’t have to search memory for them. 
As an additional test of hypothesis 11, a final experiment tests the Explicit-warrant 
strategy against the All-implicit strategy in a situation where the cost of communica- 
tion dominates other processing costs. Fig. 18 plots the differences in the performance 
means between the Explicit-warrant strategy and the All-implicit strategy for LOW, MID 
and HIGH AWM agents when communication effort dominates processing. A two-way 
anova exploring the effect of AWM and the Explicit-warrant strategy for the Standard 
task, when communication effort dominates processing, shows that AWM has a large 
effect on performance (F = 409.52, p < 0.000001). There is also a main effect for 
communicative strategy (F = 28.12, p < O.OOOOOl), and an interaction between AWM 
and communicative choice (F = 960.24, p < 0.000001) 
The planned comparisons using the MB test to compare performance at each AWM 
range show that in this situation, when communication effort dominates processing, 
the Explicit-warrant strategy is neither beneficial nor detrimental for MID AWM agents 
( MB(MID) = 0.12, ns). However, the Explicit-warrant strategy is detrimental for both 
LOW and HIGH AWM agents (MB(LOW) = 7.69, p < 0.01; MB(HIGH) = 39.65, p < 
0.01) . Since this strategy includes an extra utterance with every proposal and provides no 
clear benefits, it is detrimental to performance in the Standard task when communication 
effort dominates processing. Below, when we compare this situation with that in the 
Zero-non-matching-beliefs task, we will see that this is due to the fact that the Standard 
task has low coordination requirements. 
Close-consequence 
The Close-consequence strategy of making inferences explicit can be used in the 
Standard task to test hypothesis C4: the choice to produce a Consequence IRU is 
related to a measure of “how important” the inference is. Even though the Standard 
task is fault tolerant, every invalid step reduces the quality of solution of the final plan. 
Making act-effect inferences explicit decreases the likelihood of making this kind of 
error. 
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Fig. IX. Explicit-warrant is detrimental for LOW and HIGH AWM agents when communication effort is 
high: strategy I is two Explicit-warrant agents and strategy ? is two All-implicit agents: task = Standard. 
commcost = IO, infcost = 0, retcost = 0. 
cost - clc-kim bill-kim C= 0 . I = 0 , R = 0 
Fig. 19. Close-consequence can be detrimental in the Standard task for LOW AWM agents and beneficial for 
HIGH AWM agents. Strategy 1 is the combination of an All-implicit agent with a Close-consequence agent 
and strategy 2 is two All-implicit agents. task = Standard, commcost = 0, infcost = 0, retcost = 0. 
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The difference plot in Fig. 19 plots performance differences between the Close- 
consequence strategy and the All-implicit strategy, in the Standard task, when all process- 
ing is free. A two-way anova exploring the effect of AWM and the Close-consequence 
strategy in this situation shows that AWM has a large effect on performance (F = 249.20, 
p < 0.000001 >, and that there is an interaction between AWM and communicative choice 
(F = 919.27, p < 0.000001). 
Planned comparisons between strategies for each AWM range shows that the Close- 
consequence strategy is detrimental in comparison with All-implicit for LOW AWM 
agents (MB(LOW) = 8.70, p < 0.01). This is because generating options contributes 
more to performance for agents with LOW AWM than avoiding errors, and the additional 
utterances that make inferences explicit in the Close-consequence strategy has the effect 
of displacing facts that could be used in means-end reasoning to generate options. There 
is no difference in performance for MID AWM agents (MB(MID) = 0.439, ns). 
However, comparisons between the two strategies for HIGH AWM agents shows that 
the Close-consequence strategy is beneficial in comparison with All-implicit ( MB(HIGH) 
= 171.71, p < 0.002). See Fig. 19. This is because the belief deliberation algorithm 
increases the probability of HIGH AWM agents choosing to believe out of date beliefs 
about the state of the world. The result is that they are more likely to have invalid steps 
in their plans. Thus the Close-consequence strategy is beneficial because reinforcing the 
belief that a furniture item has been used makes it less likely that agents will believe 
that they still have that furniture item. This result is not predicted by any hypotheses, but 
as discussed in Section 4.3, this property of the belief deliberation mechanism has some 
intuitive appeal. In any case, this result provides a data point for the benefit of a strategy 
for making inferences explicit when the probability of making an error increases if that 
inference is not made. 
5.3, Zero-non-matching-beliefs task 
Remember that the Zero-non-matching-beliefs task requires a greater degree of be- 
lief coordination by requiring agents to agree on the beliefs underlying deliberation 
(WARRANTS). 21 Thus it increases the importance of making particular deliberation- 
based inferences, and can therefore be used to test hypotheses Al, A4 and A5. Below 
we will compare the performance of agents using the All-implicit strategy with the 
Explicit-warrant strategy in the Zero-non-matching-beliefs task. 
Fig. 20 plots the mean performance differences of the Explicit-warrant strategy and the 
All-implicit strategy in the Zero-non-matching-beliefs task. A two-way anova exploring 
the effect of AWM and communicative strategy for the Zero-non-matching-beliefs task, 
shows that AWM has a large effect on performance (F = 47 1.42, p < 0.000001) . There 
is also a main effect for communicative strategy (F = 379.74, p < O.OOOOOl), and an 
interaction between AWM and communicative choice (F = 669.24, p < 0.000001). 
2’ Remember that in other tasks, agents do not have to agree on WARRANTS because in situations in which 
they know of only one option, they do not need to retrieve the warrant in order to be able to decide to accept 
the proposal. Thus when agents have limited AWM, they may accept a proposal without having retrieved the 
warrant. 
match - iei-iei2 bill-kim C= 0 , I = 0 , R z 0 
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Exphcit-warrant is beneficial for Zero-non-matching-beliefs task for LOW and MID AWM 
agents: strategy I is two Explicit-warrant agents and strategy 7 is two All-implicit agents: 
task = Zero-non-matching-beliefs, commcost = 0. infcost = 0, retcost = 0. 
match - iei-iei2 bill-kim C= 10 , I = 0 , R = 0 
Fig. 7 I Explicit-warrant is beneficial for Zero-non-matching-beliefs task, for LOW and MID AWM agents, 
even when communication cost dominates processing: strategy I is two Explicit-warrant agents and strategy 
? is two All-implicit agents: task = Zero-non-matching-beliefs commcost = IO. infcost = 0, retcost = 0. 
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Comparisons within each AWM range of the two communicative strategies in this task 
shows that the Explicit-warrant strategy is highly beneficial for LOW and MID AWM 
agents (MB(LOW) = 260.6, p < 0.002; MB(MID) = 195.5, p < 0.002). The strategy 
is also beneficial for HIGH AWM agents MB(HIGH) = 4.48, p < 0.05). When agents 
are resource limited, they may fail to access a warrant. The Explicit-warrant strategy 
guarantees that the agents always can access the warrant for the option under discussion. 
Thus, even agents with higher values of AWM can benefit from this strategy, since the 
task requires such a high degree of belief coordination. 
Hypothesis 11 can also be tested in this task. We can ask whether it is possible to 
drive the total effort for communication high enough to make it inefficient to choose the 
Explicit-warrant strategy over All-implicit. However, the benefits of the Explicit-warrant 
strategy for LOW and MID AWM agents for this task are so strong that they cannot 
be reduced even when communication cost is high (MB(LOW) = 246.4, p < 0.002; 
MB(MID) = 242.7, p < 0.002). See Fig. 21. In other words, even when every extra 
WARRANT message increases collaborative effort by 10 and reduces performance by 
10, if the task is Zero-non-matching-beliefs, resource limited agents using Explicit- 
warrant do better. Contrast Fig. 21 with the Standard task and same cost parameters in 
Fig. 18. 
However, when communication cost is high, the strategy becomes detrimental for 
HIGH AWM agents (MB(HIGH) = 7.56, p < 0.01). These agents can usually access 
warrants and the increase in belief coordination afforded by the Explicit-warrant strategy 
does not offset the high communication cost. 
5.4. Inferential tasks: Matched-pair 
The two versions of the Matched-pair tasks described in Section 4.4 (1) increase the 
inferential complexity of the task and (2) increase the degree of belief coordination 
required by requiring agents to be coordinated on inferences that follow from intentions 
that have been explicitly agreed upon. Both tasks increase inferential difficulty to a 
small degree: All-implicit agents do fairly well at making Matched-pair inferences. The 
Matched-pair-same-room task requires the same inferences as the Matched-pair-two- 
room task, but these inferences should be easier to make in the Matched-pair-same-room 
since the inferential premises are more likely to be salient. 
The Matched-pair tasks provide an environment for testing hypotheses A2, A3, A4 
and A5. The Attention strategy that is used to test these hypotheses is the Matched-pair- 
inference-explicit strategy; this strategy makes the premises for Matched-pair inferences 
salient, thus increasing the likelihood of agents making Matched-pair inferences. The 
predictions are that this strategy should be beneficial for LOW and possibly for MID 
AWM agents, but that HIGH AWM agents can access the necessary inferential premises 
without Attention IRUs. Furthermore, we predict that the beneficial effect should be 
stronger for the Matched-pair-two-room task. 
Fig. 22 plots the performance differences between All-implicit agents and Matched- 
pair-inference-explicit agents for the Matched-pair-same-room task. A two-way anova 
exploring the effect of AWM and communicative strategy in this task, shows that AWM 
has a large effect on performance (F = 323.93, p < 0.000001). There is no main effect 
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for communicative strategy (F = 0.03, ns), but there is an interaction between AWM 
and communicative choice (F = 1101.51, p < 0.000001). 
Comparisons within AWM ranges between agents using the All-implicit strategy and 
agents using the Matched-pair-inference-explicit strategy in the Matched-pair-same-room 
task (Fig. 22) show that Matched-pair-inference-explicit strategy is beneficial for Low 
AWM agents (MB(LOW) = 4.47, p < 0.05), but not significantly different for either MID 
or HIGH AWM agents). In the Matched-pair-same-room task the content of the IRU was 
recently inferred and is likely to still be salient, thus the beneficial effect is relatively 
small and is restricted to very resource limited agents. 
In contrast, in the Matched-pair-two-room task, the effect on performance of the 
Matched-pair-inference-explicit strategy is much larger, as we predicted. Fig. 23 plots 
the mean performance differences of agents using the Matched-pair-inference-explicit 
strategy and those using the All-implicit strategy. The All-implicit agents do not manage 
to achieve the same levels of mutual inference as Matched-pair-inference-explicit agents. 
A two-way anova exploring the effect of AWM and communicative strategy in this task, 
shows that AWM has a large effect on performance (F = 171.79, p < 0.000001). There 
is a main effect for communicative strategy (F = 57.12, p < 0.001)) and an interaction 
between AWM and communicative choice (F = 567.34, p < 0.000001). 
Comparisons within AWM ranges between agents using the All-implicit strategy and 
agents using the Matched-pair-inference-explicit strategy in the Matched-pair-two-room 
task (Fig. 23) show that Matched-pair-inference-explicit strategy is beneficial for LOW, 
MID and HIGH AWM agents (MB(LOW) = 21.94, p < 0.01; MB(MID) = 7.71, p < 0.01; 
MB(HIGH) = 38.85, p < 0.002). In other words, this strategy is highly effective in 
increasing the ability of LOW, MID and HIGH AWM agents to make Matched-pair 
inferences in the Matched-pair-two-room task. 
We predicted the strategy to be beneficial for LOW and possibly for MID AWM agents 
because it gives agents access to premises for inferences which they would otherwise be 
unable to access. This confirms the effect of the hypothesized DISCOURSE INFERENCE 
CONSTRAINT. However, we did not expect it to be beneficial for HIGH AWM agents. 
This surprising effect is due to the fact that, in the case of higher AWh4 values, the 
Matched-pair-inference-explicit strategy keeps the agents coordinated on which inference 
the proposing agent intended in a situation in which multiple inferences are possible. In 
other words, when agents have HIGH AWM they can make divergent inferences, and a 
strategy of making inferential premises salient improves agents’ inferential coordination. 
Thus the strategy controls inferential processes in a way that was not predicted based 
on the corpus analysis alone. 
Hypothesis 11 can also be tested in this task. We can ask whether it is possible to 
drive the effort for communication high enough to make it inefficient to choose the 
Matched-pair-inference-explicit strategy over All-implicit. 
Fig. 24 plots the mean performance differences between these two strategies when 
communication cost is high. Comparisons within each AWM range shows that this 
strategy is still beneficial for LOW, MID and HIGH AWM agents even with a high com- 
munication cost (MB(LOW) = 19.10, p < 0.01; MB(MID) = 3.94, p < 0.05; MB(HIGH) 
= 10.46, p < 0.01). In other words it would be difficult to find a task situation that 
required coordinating on inference in which this strategy was not beneficial. This result 
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mp - imi-imi2-mpr bill-kim-mpr C= 10 , I = 0 , R = 0 
Fig. 24. The Matched-pair-lnfc’erence-explicit \tratrgy I\ hcneficial for LOW. MID and HIGH AWM 
agents in the Matched-pair-two-room task even with communication cost of IO. Strategy I is two 
Matched-pair-inference-explicit agents and strategy 7is two All-implicit agents, task = Matched-pair-two-room. 
commcost = IO. infcost = 0. retcost = 0. 
is strong support for the DISCOURSE INFEIENCB CONSTRAINT. which may explain 
the prevalence of this strategy in naturally occurring dialogues [ 30, 109, 1411. 
5.5. Zero-invalids tusk 
Remember that the Zero-invalids task is a fault intolerant version of the task in which 
any invalid intention invalidates the whole plan. Thus the Zero-invalids task provides 
an environment for testing hypotheses C2 and C4 with respect to the inferences made 
explicit by the Close-consequence strategy. 
Fig. 25 plots the mean performance differences between agents using the Close- 
consequence strategy and agents using the All-implicit strategy in the Zero-invalids 
task. A two-way anova exploring the effect of AWM and communicative strategy in this 
task, shows that AWM has a large effect on performance (F = 223.14. p < 0.000001). 
There is a main effect for communicative strategy (F = 75.81, p < O.OOl), and an 
interaction between AWM and communicative choice (F = 103.38, p < 0.000001). 
The Close-consequence strategy was detrimental in the Standard task for LOW AWM 
agents. Comparisons within AWM ranges between agents using the All-implicit strategy 
and agents using the Close-consequence strategy in the Zero-invalids task show that 
there are no differences in performance for LOW AWM agents in the fault intolerant 
Zero-invalids task (MB(LOW) = 3.64, ns). However, the Close-consequence strategy is 
beneficial for MID and HIGH AWM agents (MB(MID) = 26.62, p < 0.002; MB(HIGH) 
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Fig. 25. Close-consequence is beneficial for the Zero-invalids task for MID and HIGH AWM agents. Strategy 1 
is the combination of an All-implicit agent with a Close-consequence agent and strategy 2 is two All-implicit 
agents, task = Zero-invalids, commcost = 0, infcost = 0, retcost = 0. 
= 267.72, p < 0.002). In other words, this strategy is highly beneficial in increasing 
the robustness of the planning process by decreasing the frequency with which agents 
make mistakes. This is a direct result of rehearsing the act-effect inferences, making it 
unlikely that attention limited agents will forget these important inferences. 
6. Discussion 
This paper showed how agents’ choice in communicative action can be designed to 
mitigate the effect of their resource limits in the context of particular features of a col- 
laborative planning task. In Section 3, I presented a model of collaborative planning in 
dialogue and discussed a number of parameters that can affect either the efficacy of the 
final plan or the efficiency of the collaborative planning process. Then in Section 5, I 
presented the results of experiments testing hypotheses about the effects of these param- 
eters on collaborative planning dialogues. These results contribute to the development 
of the model of collaborative planning dialogue presented here. In addition, since the 
testbed implementation is compatible with many current theories, these results could be 
easily incorporated into other dialogue planning algorithms [ 17,48,5 1,53,79,88,127], 
inter alia. 
A secondary goal of this paper was to argue for a particular methodology for dialogue 
theory development. The method was specified in Section 4.1. The Design-World testbed 
was introduced in Section 4 and Sections 4.4 and 4.5 described the parameterizations 
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of the model that support testing the hypotheses. Four parameters for communicative 
strategies were tested: ( 1) All-implicit; C 2) Close-consequence; (3) Explicit-warrant; 
and (4) Matched-pair-inference-explicit. Four parameters for tasks were tested: ( 1) 
Standard; (2) Zero-non-matching-beliefs; C 3 ) Matched-pair (MP) ; (4) Zero-invalids. 
Three situations of varying processing effort were tested. 
In this section, I will first summarize the hypotheses and the experimental results 
in Section 6.1, then I will discuss how the experimental results might generalize to 
situations not implemented in the testbed. Section 6.4 proposes future work and Section 
6.5 consists of concluding remarks. 
6. I. Suttwtuq of results 
The hypotheses that were generated by the statistical analysis of the dialogue corpora 
are repeated below for convenience from Sections 2 and 4.6. 
l HYPOTH-Cl: agents produce Consequence IRUs to demonstrate that they made 
the inference that is made explicit. 
l HYPOTH-C2: agents choose to produce Consequence IRUs to ensure that the other 
agent has access to inferrable information. 
l HYPOTH-C3: the choice to produce a Consequence IRU is directly related to a 
measure of “how hard” the inference is. 
l HYPOTH-C4: the choice to produce a Consequence IRU is directly related to a 
measure of “how important” the inference is. 
l HYPOTH-C5: the choice to produce a Consequence IRU is directly related to the 
degree to which the task requires agents to be coordinated on the inferences that 
they have made. 
l HYPOTH-Al: agents produce Attention IRUs to support the processes of deliber- 
ating beliefs and intentions. 
l HYPOTH-A2: there is a DISCOURSE INFERENCE CONSTRAINT whose effect is 
that inferences in dialogue are derived from propositions that are currently discourse 
salient (in working memory ). 
l HYPOTH-A3: the choice to produce an Attention IRU is related to the degree of 
inferential complexity of a task as measured by the number of premises required 
to make task-related inferences. 
l HYPOTH-A4: the choice to produce an Attention IRU is related to the degree to 
which an agent is resource limited in attentional capacity. 
l HYPOTH-AS: the choice to produce an Attention IRU is related to the degree to 
which the task requires agents to be coordinated on the inferences that they have 
made. 
l HYPOTH-I 1: strategies that reduce collaborative effort without affecting quality of 
solution are beneficial. 
Below I will summarize the experimental results reported in Section 5 with respect 
to the hypotheses above. 
Hypotheses C3 and C4 were tested by comparing the Close-consequence strategy with 
the All-implicit strategy in the Standard task. In this experimental setup, the inference 
made explicit by the Consequence IRU was neither hard to make nor critical for per- 
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formince. Hypothesis C3 was only weakly tested by the experiments because agents 
always make this inference. The results in Fig. 19 show that the Close-consequence 
Strategy is detrimental for LOW AWM agents. This is because IRUs can displace useful 
information from working memory and because the inference made explicit with this 
IRU is not “hard enough”. 
The Standard task also provides a weak test of hypothesis C4. The fact that the 
Standard task is fault tolerant means that making the inference is not as critical as it 
might be. However, errors can result from either not making the inference or forgetting 
it once it is made. At lower values of AWM, the probability of such errors is not that 
high. However, the results shown in Fig. 19 show that the probability of error is higher 
for HIGH AWM agents in this case, because of their belief deliberation algorithm, and 
thus the Close-consequence strategy is beneficial for HIGH AWM agents, even in the 
Standard task. 
The Zero-invalids task provides another test of hypothesis C4 by increasing the impor- 
tance of the inference made explicit by the Close-consequence strategy. Fig. 25 shows 
that hypothesis C4 is confirmed because the Close-consequence strategy is beneficial for 
LOW, MID and HIGH AWM agents. In addition to the reasons discussed for the Standard 
task, this strategy is beneficial for HIGH AWM agents because they have more potential 
to improve their scores by ensuring that they don’t make errors. 
The experiments did not test hypothesis Cl because agents in the testbed are not 
designed to actively monitor evidence from other agents as to what inferences they might 
have made. Hypothesis C5 was not tested by the experiments because agents always 
rectify the situation if they detect a discrepancy in beliefs about act-effect inferences: 
they reject proposals whose preconditions do not hold. 
Hypotheses Al, A4 and A5 were tested by experiments in which the Explicit-warrant 
strategy was compared with the All-implicit strategy in the Standard task. Hypothesis Al 
is disconfirmed for LOW AWM agents. Fig. 16 shows that the Explicit-warrant strategy 
is neither beneficial nor detrimental for LOW AWM agents for the Standard task, when 
processing is free. This counter-intuitive result arises because, when agents are highly 
resource limited, IRUs can displace other information that is more useful. 
To test hypothesis 11 in this situation, we also examined two situations where pro- 
cessing is not free. When communication cost dominates other processing costs, the 
Explicit-warrant strategy is detrimental for LOW and HIGH AWM agents. However, 
when retrieval cost dominates other processing costs, the Explicit-warrant strategy is 
beneficial for MID AWM agents and there is a trend toward a beneficial effect for HIGH 
AWM agents. Thus these two situations show that hypothesis 11 is confirmed: processing 
effort has a major effect on whether a strategy is beneficial. 
We also tested hypotheses Al, A4 and A5 with experiments in which the Explicit- 
warrant strategy was compared with the All-implicit strategy in the Zero-non-matching- 
beliefs task (see Figs. 20 and 21). This task increases the importance of making 
deliberation-based inferences by requiring agents to be coordinated on these inferences 
in order to do well on the task. In this situation, we saw a very large beneficial effect 
for the Explicit-warrant strategy, which is not diminished by increasing communica- 
tion effort. Thus in situations in which agents are required to be coordinated on these 
inferences, strategies which include Attention IRUs can be very important. 
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Hypotheses A2, A3, A4. and A5 were tested by experiments comparing the Matched- 
pair-inference-explicit strategy with the All-implicit strategy in the two versions of the 
Matched-pair task. The results shown in Figs. 22 and 23 provide support for these 
hypotheses. However these results also included an unpredicted benefit of Attention 
IRUs for inferentially complex tasks where agents must coordinate on inferences. Fig. 23 
shows that both MID and HIGH AWM agents’ performance improves with the Matched- 
pair-inference-explicit strategy. This can be explained by the fact that Attention IRUs 
increase the likelihood that agents will make the Same inference, rather than divergent 
inferences, when multiple inferences are possible. 
Furthermore, although the Matched-pair-inference-explicit strategy is specifically tied 
to Matched-pair inferences, it provides a test of a general strategy for making premises 
for inferences salient, when tasks are inferentially complex and require agents to remain 
coordinated on inferences. Thus it provides strong support for the DISCOURSE INFER- 
ENCE CONSTRAINT. To generalize this strategy to other cases of plan-related inferences. 
the clauses in the strategy plan operator that specifically refer to Matched-pair inferences 
can be replaced with a more general inference. e.g. the more general (Generates ?actl 
A ?act2 ?act3), where the generates relation is to be inferred [ 33,51,97]. 
Hypothesis 11 was tested by examining extremes in cost ratios for retrieval effort and 
communication effort whenever a hypothesis about the beneficial effects of IRUs was 
confirmed. Fig. I8 shows that high communication effort can make the Explicit-warrant 
strategy detrimental in the Standard task. Fig. 21 shows that high communication effort 
does not eliminate the benefits of the Explicit-warrant strategy in the Zero-non-matching- 
beliefs task. Fig. 24 shows that high communication effort does not eliminate the benefits 
of the Matched-pair-inference-explicit strategy in the Matched-pair-two-room task. Thus 
the strategy of making premises for inferences salient is robust against extremes in 
processing effort. 
6.2. Generalizability of the results 
This section addresses concerns raised in 1541 that simulation is “experimentation in 
the small”. Hanks writes that [54, Section 5.1.51: 
The ultimate value-arguably the otllJ value-of experimentation is to constrain 
or otherwise inform the designer of a system that solves interesting problems. In 
order to do so the experimenter must demonstrate three things: 
( I ) that her results-the relationships she demonstrates between agent characteris- 
tics and world characteristics-extend beyond the particular agent, world, and 
problem specification she studied, 
( 2) that the solution to the problem area she studied in isolation will be applicable 
when that same problem area is encountered in a larger, more complex world, 
and 
( 3 ) that the relationship demonstrated experimentally actually constrains or some- 
how guides the design of a larger more realistic agent. 
The list in ( 1 )-( 3) are all different ways of saying that the results should generalize 
beyond the specifics of the experiment, and this after all is a basic issue with all experi- 
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mental work. Typically generalizations can be shown by a series of multiple experiments 
modifying multiple variables as we have done here. For example, the modifications to 
the task are specifically designed to test whether beneficial communicative strategies 
generalize across tasks. However, we might also ask to what extent do the variables 
manipulated in the simulation abstract out key properties of real situations? Below I will 
briefly discuss why the results presented above are potentially generalizable. I will focus 
on generalizations along three dimensions: ( 1) task (or environmental) properties; (2) 
agent architectural properties; and (3) agent behaviors. These dimensions are the same 
as those in Cohen’s “ecological triangle” [ 241. 
Generalizations about tasks 
The Design-World task was selected as a simple planning task that requires negotia- 
tion of each step. The structure of this task is isomorphic to a subcomponent of many 
collaborative planning tasks. In addition, to test generalizability of hypothesized benefits 
across tasks, we examined more complex variants of the task by manipulating three 
abstract features: (1) inferential complexity as measured by the number of premises re- 
quired for making a task-related inference and (2) degree of belief coordination required 
on intentions, inferences and beliefs underlying a plan; and (3) the task determinacy 
and fault tolerance of the plan. These general features can certainly be applied to other 
tasks in other domains. In fact it is difficult to think of a task or domain in which these 
features could not be applied. 
Generalizations about agent properties 
Design-World agents are artificial agents that are designed to model the resource 
limited qualities of human agents. The planning and deliberation aspects of human pro- 
cessing are modeled with the IRMA architecture, and resource limits on these processes 
are modeled by extending the IRMA architecture with a model of attention/working 
memory (AWM) which has been shown to model a limited but critical set of prop- 
erties of human processing. The way that agents process dialogue is tied to the agent 
architecture. 
The experimental results will extend to dialogues between artificial agents to the extent 
that those agents exhibit similar cognitive properties. Here, we looked at a resource 
bound on access to memory as modeled by a size of memory subset limit, however 
size is directly correlated to time to access memory. Artificial agents are often time 
limited in rapidly changing worlds, so it seems quite plausible that artificial agents 
would benefit from similar communicative strategies. For example, I would predict that 
agents in the Phoenix simulation testbed would benefit from the strategies discussed here 
[ 241. In other work artificial agents do “make inferences explicit” by communicating 
to other agents partial computations when the other agent might have been able to 
make these computations [ 24,36,130]. In addition, defining inferential complexity as a 
direct consequence of the number of premises simultaneously in memory bears a strong 
resemblance to problems artificial processors have when a computation requires a large 
working set [ 1221. 
The experimental results should extend to dialogues between humans and artificial 
agents because Design-World agents are designed to model humans. However it may be 
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desirable to change the definition of collaborative effort for modeling human-computer 
interaction to allow the computer to handle processing that is easy for the computer to do 
and for the human to handle processing that is easy for the human to do. Furthermore, 
most of the claims about the AWM model are based on a limited set of human working 
memory properties, and these properties will also hold for other cognitively based 
architectures such as SOAR 174,771. 
Gerlerali:ations about agent behaviors 
In this work the agent behaviors that were tested were the agent communication strate- 
gies. One reason to believe that the strategies are general to human-human discourse is 
that they were based on observed strategies in different corpora of natural collaborative 
planning dialogues. It is possible to find all three types of IRUs in the Trains, Map-task 
and Design corpora [ 12,98, 128, 1421. as well as in the financial advice domain. 
In addition to this empirical evidence, there are further reasons why we might expect 
generalizations. 
The communicative acts and discourse acts used by Design-World agents are similar 
to those used in [ 12. 14, I 13. 1201. Thus communicative strategies based on these acts 
should be implementable in any of these systems. 
The experimental results based on these strategies hould generalize to other discourse 
situations because the strategies are based on general relations between utterance acts 
and underlying processes. such as supporting deliberation and inference. For example, 
the mapping of a WARRANT relation between an act and a belief in naturally occurring 
examples such as (9) was modeled with a WARRANT relation between an act and a be- 
lief in Design-World. as seen in the Explicit-warrant communication strategy. The claims 
made about the use of the Explicit-warrant communication strategy should generalize to 
any dialogue planning domain where agents use warrants to support deliberation. 
Similarly. content-based inferences in natural dialogues such as that discussed in 
relation to example ( 1 1) were modeled with content-based inferences in Design-World 
such as those required for doing well on the Matched-pair tasks. This inferential situation 
was designed to test the DISCOURSE INFERENCE CONSTRAINT, that inferences in 
dialogue are restricted to premises that are currently salient. Both experimental and 
corpus-based evidence was provided in support of the discourse inference constraint. 
The claims made about the use of the Matched-pair-inference-explicit communication 
strategy. based on experimental evidence, should generalize to any dialogue strategy 
where agents make premises for inferences available, and to any planning domain 
where agents are required to make content-based inferences in support of deliberation 
or planning. 
The evaluation metrics applied to these strategies should also generalize whenever 
domain plan utility is a reasonable measure of the quality of solution for a dialogue 
task. 
6.3. Relation to other work 
The model of collaborative planning dialogues presented in Section 3 draws from 
previous work on cooperative dialogue [ 10,21,30,37,50,5 1,67,85,97,98,141,143], 
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and the results are applicable to other current research on collaborative planning [ 17, 
26,32,48,53,56,87,113,127,146]. 
The agent architecture and the model of deliberation and means-end reasoning is 
based on the work of [ 7,341, and on Pollack’s TileWorld simulation environment [ 991. 
The use of IRMA as an underlying model of intention deliberation to provide a basis 
for a collaborative planning model was first proposed in [ 13 I-1331, and has been 
incorporated into other work [48,146]. The architecture includes a specific model of 
limited working memory, but most of the claims about the model are based on its 
recency and frequency properties, which might also be provided by other cognitively 
based architectures such as SOAR [ 74,771. ** Since the testbed architecture is consistent 
with that assumed in other work, the experimental results should be generalizable to 
those frameworks. 
The relationship between discourse acts and domain-based options and intentions in 
this work is based on Litman’s model of discourse plans [ 85,861 and is similar to the 
approach in [ 12,14,127]. The emphasis on autonomy at each stage of the planning 
process and the belief reasoning mechanism of Design-World agents is based on the 
theory of belief revision and the multi-agent simulation environment developed in the 
Automated Librarian project [ 14,38,40,88]. 
The Design-World testbed is based on the methods used in the TileWorld and Phoenix 
simulation environments: rapidly changing robot worlds in which an artificial agent 
attempts to optimize reasoning and planning [ 24,54,99]. TileWorld is a single agent 
world in which the agent interacts with its environment, rather than with another agent. 
Design-World uses similar methods to test a theory of the effect of resource limits on 
communicative behavior between two agents. 
Design-World is also based on the method used in Carletta’s JAM simulation for the 
Edinburgh Map-task [ 12,100]. JAM is based on the Map-task dialogue corpus, where 
the goal of the task is for the planning agent, the instructor, to instruct the reactive 
agent, the instructee, how to get from one place to another on the map. JAM focuses 
on efficient strategies for recovery from error and parameterizes agents according to 
their communicative and error recovery strategies. Given good error recovery strategies, 
Carletta argues that “high risk” communicative strategies are more efficient, but did 
not attempt to quantify efficiency. In contrast, the approach here provides a way of 
quantifying what is an effective or efficient strategy, and the results suggest that a 
combination of the agents’ resource limitations and the task definition determine when 
strategies are efficient. Future work could test Carletta’s claims about recovery strategies 
within this extended framework. 
To my knowledge, none of this earlier work has considered the factors that affect 
the range of variation in communicative choice, or the effects of different choices, or 
measured how communicative choice affects the construction of a collaborative plan and 
the ability of the conversants to stay coordinated. Nor have other theories of collabo- 
rative planning been explicit about the agent architecture, or tested specific ideas about 
22 [ 1361 discusses the differences between an AWM-like attentional model and Grosz and Sidner’s stack 
model of attentional state [49,50,114]. See also [ 1071 for a discussion of other discourse phenomena for 
which the AWM model may be useful. 
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resource bounds in dialogue, and none have used utility as the basis for agents’ com- 
municative choice. In addition, no earlier work on cooperative task-oriented dialogue 
argued that conversational agents’ resource limits and task complexity are major factors 
in determining effective conversational strategies in collaboration. 
6.4. Future work 
A promising avenue for future work is to investigate beneficial strategies for teams 
of heterogeneous agents. In the experiments here, pairs of agents in dialogue were 
always parameterized with the same resource limits. Pilot studies of dialogues between 
heterogeneous agents suggest that strategies that are not effective for homogeneous 
agents may be effective for heterogeneous ones. For example. in [ 1331 I tested an 
Attention IRU strategy in which agents would tell one another about all the options they 
knew about at the beginning of planning each room. This strategy is not beneficial for 
homogeneous agents because IRUs can displace other useful information. However if 
one agent is not limited, then it can be helpful for the resource limited agent to exploit 
the capabilities of the more capable agent by telling the other agent important facts 
before it forgets them. 
Another extension would be to extend the agent communication strategies or to test 
additional ones. For example, other work proposes a number of strategies for information 
selection and ordering in dialogue and provides some evidence that these strategies are 
efficient or efficacious [ I 1, 17. 123, 147 1. Support for these claims could be provided by 
Design-World experiments in which agents used these strategies to communicate. 
Future work could also modify the properties of the world or of the task. For example, 
it would be possible to make Design-World more like TileWorld by making the world 
change in the course of the task, by adding or removing furniture. 
These results may also be incorporated as input into decision algorithms in which 
agents decide online which strategy to pursue, and investigate additional factors that 
determine when strategies are effective in collaborative planning dialogues. The results 
presented here show what information an agent should consider. For example, a com- 
parison between LOW. MD and HIGH AWM agents shows how to design decision 
algorithms for agents who have to decide whether to expend additional effort. 
Another promising avenue is make the agents capable of remembering and learning 
from past mistakes so that they can adapt their strategies to the situation [3]. 
Finally, these results should be incorporated into the design of multi-agent problem- 
solving systems and into systems for human-computer communication, such as those 
for teaching, advice and explanation, where for example the use of particular strategies 
might be premised on the abilities of the learner or apprentice. 
6.5. Concluding remarks 
The goal of this paper was to show how agents’ choice in communicative action, 
their algorithms for language behavior, can be designed to mitigate the effect of their 
resource limits in the context of particular features of a collaborative planning task. 
In this paper. I first motivate a number of hypotheses based on a statistical analysis 
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of natural collaborative planning dialogues. Then a functional model of collaborative 
planning dialogues is developed based on these hypotheses, including parameters that are 
hypothesized to affect the generalizability of the model. The model is then implemented 
in a testbed in which these parameters can be varied, and the hypotheses are tested. 
The method used here can be contrasted with other work on dialogue modeling. Much 
previous work on dialogue modeling only carries out part of the process described above: 
only the initial part of the process up to specifying a functional model is completed. 
Follow-on research that is based on these models must judge the model according to 
subjective criteria such as how well it fits researcher’s intuitions or how elegant the 
model is. The models developed here on the basis of empirical evidence can also be 
judged according to these subjective criteria, but this work carries out additional steps 
to further test and refine the model suggested by the corpus analysis. Implementing a 
model with parameters to test the generalizability of the model and testing hypotheses 
in a testbed implementation provides a way to check subjective evaluations and suggests 
many ways in which our initial hypotheses must be refined and further tested. 
The Design-World testbed is the first testbed for conversational systems that systemat- 
ically introduces several different types of independent parameters that are hypothesized 
to affect the efficacy of a collaborative plan negotiated through a dialogue, and the 
efficiency of that dialogue process. Experiments in the testbed examined the interaction 
between ( 1) agents’ resource limits in attentional capacity and inferential capacity; (2) 
agents’ choice in communication; and (3) features of communicative tasks that affect 
task difficulty such as inferential complexity, degree of belief coordination required, 
and tolerance for errors. The results verified a number of hypotheses that depended on 
particular assumptions about agents’ resource limits that were not possible to test by 
corpus analysis alone. 
Several unpredicted and counter-intuitive results were also demonstrated by the ex- 
periments. First, the task property of belief coordination in combination with resource 
limits (as in the Zero-non-matching-beliefs and Matched-pair tasks), were shown to 
produce the most robust benefits for IRUs, rather than resource limits alone as originally 
hypothesized. Second, I predicted that IRUs would always be beneficial for LOW Awh4 
agents, but found that IRUs can be detrimental for these agents through a side effect 
of displacing other, more useful, beliefs from working memory. Third, it would seem 
plausible that HIGH AWM agents should always perform better than either LOW or MID 
AWM agents since these agents always have access to more information. However the 
results showed that there are two situations in which this is not an advantage: (1) when 
accessing information has some cost; and (2) when access to multiple beliefs can lead 
agents to make divergent inferences. In this case, restricting agents to a small shared 
working set is a natural way to limit inferential processes. This limit intuitively corre- 
sponds to potential benefits of limited working memory for humans and explains how 
humans manage to coordinate on inferences in conversation [49,66,83]. 
These results clearly demonstrate that factors not previously considered in dialogue 
models must be taken into account of claims if cooperativity, efficiency, or efficacy are to 
be supported. In addition, I have shown that a theory of dialogue that includes a model 
of resource limited processing can account for both the observed language behavior in 
human-human dialogue and the experimental results presented here. 
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